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Four years after the unprecedented influx of refugees to Europe in 2015/2016, Europe still only 
has temporary solutions for refugee protection. The current regulations of the Common 
European Asylum System are not capable of handling another influx of refugees like that of 
2015/2016. The negotiations for a reform have stagnated, despite ongoing debate since 2016. 
Asylum seekers keep crossing the Mediterranean, and in pursuit of solutions, political tension 
appears strong. A series of studies of citizen’s reactions to the refugee crisis in Europe have 
documented an increase in demands for restrictions and border controls. But beyond immediate 
reactions, much remains unknown about citizen preferences over specific asylum policies.  
 
The research question posed here is: Do citizens support a European system of responsibility-
sharing for the reception of asylum applicants even if that means accepting more applicants? 
A study conducted in 15 European countries in the early spring of 2016 found broad-based 
support for responsibility-sharing of asylum seekers. The purpose of this thesis is to test if that 
finding replicates. A tougher test of the original study is possible through within-country 
comparison in a context where the situation concerning asylum seekers has changed 
substantially. This contextual change is utilized with the objective of extending the knowledge 
introduced by the original authors. The replication data was collected through a survey 
experiment in the Norwegian Citizen Panel Wave 16 (fall 2019). How citizens make the trade-
off between responsibility-sharing and accepting more applicants to their country, is 
determined through a set of randomly assigned manipulations.  
 
Comparison of cross-national data collected in 2016 and data collected among Norwegian 
respondents in 2019, show that the number of received asylum applications is important when 
citizens form their preferences, but responsibility-sharing is decisive for the majority of 
citizens. The data collected for this thesis successfully replicated the findings from the original 
study. The conclusion is that citizens still support a European system of responsibility sharing 
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1.   Introduction 
There is a lack of responsibility-sharing in the handling of asylum applications to Europe. The 
shortage of such a mechanism became particularly obvious during the Refugee Crisis of 
2015/2016. A reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has been debated 
since the refugee crisis, but so far without results. Knowledge about what mechanisms for 
responsibility-sharing citizens would support is an important supplement to this debate. 
However, attitudes toward international agreements regarding immigration policy have 
received little scientific attention. A key study addressing this question is Bansak, Hainmueller 
and Hangartner (2017a). Its findings were surprising to many. At the height of the refugee crisis 
there was broad-based citizen support for responsibility-sharing across 15 European countries. 
This study is a solid piece of comparative research, but it is a one-off. In social science we 
typically want to base our knowledge on broader grounds, especially on an issue as 
controversial as this. A replication of Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner’s (BHH) survey 
experiment can thus be a valuable contribution. Moreover, as BHH’s study was conducted in 
the context of the refugee crisis, a replication seems even more appreciable as the situation has 
changed. The annual number of asylum applicants to Europe since 2017 is almost half the 
number received in 2015 and 2016 (Eurostat 2019a). The allocation mechanisms presented for 
BHH’s respondents would thus have very different implications for some of the countries 
surveyed in their study today versus the time of their data collection. In this thesis, I make use 
of this contextual change to perform a tougher test of the finding brought to light by Bansak, 
Hainmueller and Hangartner.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to replicate BHH’s study. This is pursued in three parts. The first 
part is a verification of their results. A separate analysis of the data they collected in 2016 will 
be carried out. The second part is a direct replication. New data is collected through an “exact” 
replication to test whether their findings are replicated under different contextual 
circumstances. The third part is an extended replication. New data is collected under different 
contextual circumstances with updated information to reflect today’s situation. BHH’s 
conclusion is based on cross-national comparison of data collected in the early spring of 2016. 
This study presents a within-country comparison of the data collected by BHH and data 
collected exclusively for this thesis in the fall of 2019, in a country where the situation 





1.1 Focus and Scope 
The starting point for this thesis was the pronounced lack of responsibility-sharing in the 
handling of asylum applications to Europe during the refugee crisis. The focus of this thesis is 
thus on European policy, as opposed to other national/global policies such as resettlement 
refugees (quota refugees). Obviously, these debates and policies are highly related, so some 
national and international discussions will also be touched upon.  
 
The crucial agreement concerning handling of asylum applications in Europe is the Dublin 
Regulation. The Dublin Regulation says that an asylum seeker has to file his or her application 
in the European country of first entry. This system leads to a disproportionate distribution of 
asylum applications. In their survey experiment, BHH found that Europeans prefer a 
distribution system of asylum applicants implying more responsibility-sharing. They prefer this 
over the existing system based on “first entry” in Europe.  
 
The method applied here is population-based survey experiment. In order to determine whether 
citizens support a system of responsibility-sharing even if that means accepting more 
applicants, respondents are presented with a trade-off. The original authors describe this a clash 
between normative and consequentialist considerations. To determine which force overrides 
the other when the two are in conflict, they designed a set of randomly assigned manipulations. 
This involved informing the respondents about the numerical consequences of each of the 
allocation mechanisms they were presented with. The design for the new data collection carried 
out for this study builds directly on BHH’s design. The four treatment groups constitute the 
independent variables in the analyses, and the dependent variable is the preferred allocation 
mechanism.  
 
Norway was one of the major reception countries per capita in 2015, but ever since the number 
of received asylum applications has decreased considerably in Norway. This is happening 
during a time with more refugees in the world than ever before (UNHCR 2019). As a Schengen 
member, Norway follows EU rules when it comes to the handling of asylum applications. 
Norway was among the few countries in BHH’s survey that took a greater share with the status 
quo allocation than they would if the applications were to be distributed according to a system 
founded on responsibility-sharing. Thus, the Norwegian respondents in BHH’s survey did not 




collected in Norway for the original study are not adequate to answer the second part of the 
research question posed for this thesis alone. However, the results from the other European 
countries are assumed to apply for Norway as well. As the situation has changed a new data 
collection allows to test this assumption explicitly within a country. 
 
1.2 Relevance   
This thesis makes important empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions to the 
existing literature. Empirically, little evidence exist about how citizens view and evaluate 
international institutions responsible for migration policies. In an effort to fill this lacuna, this 
thesis contributes with valuable insight to citizens’ attitudes toward responsibility-sharing of 
asylum seekers in Europe.  
Theoretically, the thesis brings forward assumptions and theories from several fields within 
public opinion studies. First of all, it illuminates the original author’s argument concerning the 
conflict between normative and consequentialist considerations for the formation of 
preferences towards asylum policies. In addition, the findings of the thesis inform the general 
field of attitudes toward immigration, as well as the more specific field investigating 
the refugee crisis’ effect on public opinion. Moreover, it builds on Michael Tomz’ (2004) 
theory about how citizens form their preferences about international agreements.  
Methodologically, the study is designed in a systematic manner in order to test BHH’s finding 
in several ways. The combination of a direct and extended replication in the same data 
collection makes this a unique study. The respondents interviewed by BHH in 2016 and the 
data collected for the direct replication in 2019 are exposed to the same exact treatment, which 
arrange for a comparison of the same treatment, within the same country, but in a different 
context. In addition, the extended replication allows for comparison of the results among 
respondents prompted with different treatments within the same country and context. When the 
group in the direct replication is compared to the groups in the extended replication, the effect 
of the treatment can be tested explicitly. This carefully developed design demonstrates the 






1.3 Research Question and Overview of the Structure 
I want to find out what the support is among ordinary citizens for responsibility-sharing in the 
handling of asylum applications to Europe, and how they make the trade-off between normative 
and consequentialist considerations. I ask the following research question: 
 
Do citizens support a European system of responsibility-sharing for the reception of 
asylum applicants even if that means accepting more applicants? 
 
Chapter 2 provides insight into the empirical and theoretical background for the thesis. This 
includes the CEAS, public opinion research, the original study and why it should be replicated. 
The hypotheses for each of the three replications forming the thesis are also revealed here. 
Chapter 3 concerns the method and study design. The method and design of the original study 
is explained first, before population-based survey experiments are briefly discussed and 
different forms of replication are clarified. The design for each of the three studies are then 
presented. The subsection on the extended replication is further divided in four parts. These 
parts explain the refugee crisis, the succeeding policy shifts and the situation concerning 
asylum applicants when the replication study was designed. The fifth section of chapter 3 
introduces the data material. BHH’s data is described first, followed by the replication data and 
a discussion regarding the use of weights in survey data. The results are presented in chapter 
4, after which they are discussed in chapter 5. A summary of the thesis and conclusion 













2. Empirical and Theoretical Background  
This chapter describes the background of the study. I first present the main elements of the 
European Asylum System which is the main topic of study. I then turn to describing existing 
knowledge about public opinion towards asylum policies and international agreements. The 
study to be replicated will be presented before the hypotheses are laid out.  
 
2.1 A Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
Free movement of capital and labor within the EU is the very foundation of the Union. An 
important step in creating a borderless internal EU is the Schengen Agreement. In order to 
assign responsibility for the processing of asylum applications to Europe following the 
Schengen Agreement, the Dublin Convention was established in 1990. Norway entered the 
Schengen agreement, and thus the Dublin Convention, in 2001. It was replaced by the Dublin 
II Regulation in 2003, and the Dublin III Regulation in 2014. The main purpose of the 
Regulation was efficient handling of applications. It was not designed to ensure fair sharing of 
responsibility (Radjenovic 2019).  
 
The status quo of the Dublin regulation is that an asylum seeker is generally required to submit 
their application in the country through which they first entered Europe. In addition to the 
Dublin Regulation the CEAS consist of the EURODAC regulation, a common European 
database of fingerprints, and three other directives for cooperation. To ensure quality decisions, 
in particular greater protection of unaccompanied minors and victims of torture, a common 
Asylum Procedures Directive has been agreed on. Fundamental rights, such as housing, are 
ensured under the Reception Conditions Directive. Lastly, the Qualification Directive clarify 
the grounds for international protection and improve integration of those entitled to protection 
(European Commission, n.d).  
 
Even though the CEAS regulations proved insufficient to handling the influx of refugees in 
2015/16, countries have not been able to come to agreement on a new set of regulations. The 
European countries’ refugee policy is de facto decided nationally, and it has remained so 
despite attempts by the EU to change this. The negotiations for a Dublin IV Regulation seem 
to have stagnated, despite ongoing debate since 2016. Such a reform is a prerequisite for a 
greater reform of the CEAS – which is crucial considering the high numbers of refugees and 




2019; Rasche 2019). The focus of the data collection carried out for this thesis is limited to the 
Dublin regulation specifically.  
 
2.1.1 Norway’s Position in the Negotiations 
As a Schengen member, Norway has the right and the obligation to apply common EU rules 
such as police and legal cooperation on criminal cases, visa rules and rules on controlling 
persons crossing the external Schengen border. Primarily, this has implications for the police, 
prosecuting authorities, and the immigration authorities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2018). When new rules are developed for the Schengen 
acquis, the Commission is obliged to consult Norway in the same manner as other EU 
countries. Norway is entitled to take part in the formulation of new provisions, and this 
participation takes place in the Mixed Committee (the EU member states, the Commission, 
Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). After consultations in the Mixed Committee, 
rules have to be adopted by the EU member states in the Commission. Norway may then decide 
on an independent basis whether to adopt and incorporate those rules into Norwegian law 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2018). However, 
Norway is not a formal partner in the development of the migration and asylum policy of the 
EU, even though such policies have clear consequences for Norway (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2018). When the Commission put forward 
a proposition for reforming the EU’s asylum policy in the summer of 2016, Council President 
at the time, Donald Tusk, pronounced that the leaders of the EU would get back to the reform 
of the Dublin regulation in December that year, aiming at a new agreement in the beginning of 
2018. Norway did not participate in those negotiations, “but provided some input” (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2017). Those negotiations will be elaborated on in the section on Europe’s 
response to the refugee crisis in the next chapter.  
 
2.1.2 Other Countries’ Stance  
The first steps toward a common European migration- and asylum policy were taken more than 
20 years ago. Still, it remains unfinished. The opposition to surrender decisional power to the 
European level concerning population and territory, may be explained by the fact that these are 
existential issues for all states. It is a tense issue of dynamics between the nation state and the 
supranational level. This tension has been manifested in locked positions, distrust and inertia 




The European Parliament is not the main actor in these negotiations, the member states are, of 
which several have demonstrated little interest. Hungary has refused to accept a single refugee 
through EU’s distribution system. Together with Poland, they are at the forefront to oppose all 
plans for a common asylum policy. The two other Visegrád countries, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, are also determined to refuse a uniform asylum policy that will force them to accept 
asylum seekers. Austria is another member mentioned by political analysts as difficult to 
discuss a settlement with (Knutson 2019; Rosén and Olsson 2019, 7; Stenberg 2019, 8). The 
three Baltic countries would hardly be likely to accept such an agreement, considering a total 
number of 685 received asylum seekers in 2018 (Eurostat 2019a). Sweden, on the other hand, 
has sought to initiate a more uniform asylum policy with the EU even long before the refugee 
crisis of 2015. The French President Emmanuel Macron has proposed a cooperation similar to 
the cases of Schengen and the Eurozone, where a common settlement was not possible. An 
agreement including only some of the EU countries may be the most prominent solution in this 
matter (Knutson 2019; Rosén and Olsson 2019, 7; Stenberg 2019, 8). France, Germany, Italy 
and Malta met in September 2019 to discuss a temporary and voluntary system for the 
relocation of asylum seekers. France and Germany said they would receive twenty-five percent 
each of people rescued at sea. Italy agreed to host up to ten percent, as they had already received 
tens of thousands. Spain rejected the new system (Nicolás 2019). A more permanent proposal 
was sent out from Berlin to the other member states in November 2019. A key aspect of this 
proposal was to terminate the Dublin regulation. The document suggests that “The decision on 
which country would be responsible would be taken on the basis of a “fair share” through 
factors such as population size and GDP”, and also include suggestions on matters such as 
access to the welfare state (Barigazzi 2019). Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has 
promised a new migration package in the first half of this year, 2020 (Schulz 2019).  
 
Swedish economists Henrekson, Sanandaji, and Öner (2019) have researched whether a 
common refugee policy is desirable for the EU Member States. They say that “Member States 
simply see the benefits of the current system”. They emphasize how important it is for states 
to be able to control their own boundaries, monitor refugee’s access to their territory and legally 
judge whether asylum seekers should be granted refugee status and financial aid. 
 
When the EU failed to implement effective measures to deal with the refugee crisis in 
the fall of 2015, states began to exploit the opportunities the Schengen Agreement gives 




serious threat to public order and internal security (Henrekson, Sanandaji, and Öner 
2019). 
 
Furthermore, they argue that a common migration policy is not an effective solution, and that 
such policies should be formulated at the national level, in collaboration with the regional and 
local levels. A compelling common EU refugee policy would fuel EU skepticism, they say.  
 
2.2 Public Opinion Research  
Political science literature has in various ways shown that in democratic countries, policy 
responds dynamically to public opinion, and issue salience enhances this impact (e.g. Burstein 
2003; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995 refferred to in; Bansak, Hainmueller, and 
Hangartner 2016, 217). Frequently improved knowledge of public opinion is thus of great 
value. However, public opinion is just one of many important factors determining policy. With 
regards to foreign policy, public opinion seems to be of less interest. Ordinary citizens are 
typically not asked about their preferences for international agreements. By and large, the 
government is trusted to make the best decisions on behalf of the country with respect to foreign 
affairs. However, when it comes to asylum policy, domestic and foreign policies are linked in 
a particularly complex way. The decisions taken and agreements made on the international 
level all of a sudden affect people’s everyday life. This is something policymakers and scholars 
of international agreements are not so used to. Hence, studies of public opinion about 
international agreements are rare.  
 
There is a general lack of evidence regarding domestic support for the design of 
international institutions. This is a notable lacuna in the social science literature given 
that the successful functioning of international institutions hinges on whether their 
design is widely supported by domestic voters and upholds shared norms about equality 
and fairness (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a, 1).  
 
There seems to be growing awareness concerning the role public opinion has with regards to 
international affairs. As political leaders are responsive to the public, the lack of knowledge 
regarding public opinion about international agreements may hinder progress in the 
development of international institutions. There is one big, important study on this specific 
topic. Namely the one cited above. An article authored by Bansak, Hainmueller, and 




This is the study replicated in this thesis. The article was published in Nature Human 
Behaviour, a well reputed journal, and the authors are among the world’s most prominent 
scholars of both survey experiments and immigration policy. They are experts in these fields 
and have published a vast line of research in a number of high-ranking journals. What they find 
in this study is a great contribution both for theory and policy. A replication of their survey 
experiment is thus an opportune contribution.  
 
This section seeks to clarify where this study belongs in relation to existing public opinion 
research. A summary of the literature on public opinion about immigration will be given first. 
It is followed by a brief review of some research done where international agreements and other 
policy issues intersect, as studies investigating public opinion about international agreements 
regarding immigration policy are lacking. 
 
2.2.1 Attitudes toward Immigration  
Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) have reviewed a wide range of studies explaining mass 
attitudes toward immigration in North America and Western Europe. As far as individual-level 
approaches go, they conclude that the labor market competition hypothesis lack empirical 
support, and they confirm that having more education correlates with less restrictive 
immigration views. With regard to sociotropic approaches, they verify that pre-existing anti-
immigrant sentiments lead to overestimation of the foreign-born population and more negative 
evaluations of the state of the economy. They also evaluate research emphasizing attitudes 
toward social aggregates to be supported empirically. The literature is not consistent on how 
group-specific negative attitudes are, but they confirm that prejudice and ethnocentrism are 
linked to increased support for restrictive immigration attitudes. They also verify that 
information environments and elite rhetoric play central roles in explaining immigration 
attitudes. In their final conclusion they emphasize that the relationship between immigration 
attitudes and political ideology needs to be explored further (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 
241-245).  
 
In general, citizens holding right-wing or conservative ideologies are more likely to oppose 
immigration (e.g. Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016, 219; Castelli Gattinara 2017; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 406). “Voters have political value systems that determine how 




Kaltwasser 2018, 1686). Some citizens assess information and then adjust their attitudes, and 
others hold negative attitudes and then interpret all information in light of those predispositions. 
The first type is more pragmatic in that they weigh arguments, both pros and cons, before 
making up their minds. The latter type has a narrower mindset. On the matter of a policy reform 
implying more asylum applicants to one’s society, the costs are weighed against international 
responsibility for refugee protection. Citizens with rightist predispositions are expected to 
oppose such a reform. Karreth, Singh, and Stojek (2015, 1196) call these citizens “more 
receptive to economic and cultural threats”. They (2015) emphasize the importance of 
accounting for individual predispositions when theorizing how citizens form their attitudes 
toward immigration. In their examination of the competition/conflict and contact theories, they 
find that predictions following both theories are better assessed when individual-level 
ideological orientations are accounted for. Homola and Tavits (2018) reach a similar 
conclusion three years later: They find support for the contact hypothesis among leftist voters, 
but no support, or even increased perception of threat, among rightist voters.  
 
2.2.2 Attitudes toward International Agreements  
The focus of this study is public attitudes toward a common European system of sharing 
responsibility for the reception of asylum applicants. Such a system would entail an 
international agreement, and hence what is under examination here is ordinary citizen’s 
perception of an international agreement involving immigration policy. This is not a very 
common approach in the field of public opinion studies. International and domestic politics 
become interwoven as the consequences of international agreements affect people in a way that 
foreign affairs normally not do. This is a policy issue that brings about political awareness 
among ordinary citizens on a policy level where opinion studies are rare. 
 
Michael Tomz (2004) is among the few researchers who explores the research area where 
public opinion and international agreements intersect. He develops and tests a two-factor theory 
for policy choice, claiming that the link from interests to preferences is conditional on 
information. Through various experimental approaches, Tomz has further explored the topic 
of public opinion about international agreements on a wide range of policy issues. Rho and 
Tomz (2017) look at preferences for trade politics. Their experimental design is similar to that 
of this study, as “selfish policy preferences” and “altruistic values” are in conflict. They found 




respondent’s preferences and beliefs. Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo (2019) focus on public 
opinion about the use of military force. They find that the public opinion matters to democratic 
leaders, and that security policy is important for the electorate. Tingley and Tomz (2019) 
investigate how the Paris Agreement affect public support for climate change policies. Their 
results show, among other things, that Americans across the political spectrum were far more 
likely to favor policy change after the government had agreed to take part in the Paris 
Agreement.  
 
2.2.3 The Original Study 
The research question for the article replicated in this thesis was “What type of common asylum 
regime would Europeans support?”. The background for BHH’s study was the lack of a fair 
responsibility-sharing mechanism among the “Dublin countries”1, which is one of the reasons 
the refugee crisis became so intractable. The Dublin regulation determines the allocation of 
asylum seekers coming to Europe. Under the current regulations, the country an asylum seeker 
first enters is responsible for registering the asylum claim. This allocation rule leads to a 
“disproportionate burden for the external border countries of the European Union” (Bansak, 
Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a, 1). In their survey, respondents could choose between 
three allocation rules. The first alternative was the status quo; based on the country of first 
entry. The second was the same number of applications for every European country. The third 
option was proportional to the country’s capacity; defined by population, GDP, unemployment 
rate, and number of past applications. The theoretical assumption forming the basis for BHH’s 
experimental study is that respondents would face a conflict between consequentialist 
considerations and norms of distributive justice:  
 
Respondents who care mostly about the consequences of the asylum policy will likely 
prefer the allocation rule that brings the fewest asylum seekers to their country. 
However, respondents might also be driven by normative considerations and care about 
fairness in the design of the asylum allocation mechanism (Bansak, Hainmueller, and 
Hangartner 2017a, 2).  
 
                                                 
1 “By ‘Dublin countries’, we refer to all European Union member states that currently apply the Dublin Regulation, 
as well as Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, which are part of the European Free Trade Association. 





“Equal allocation” and “proportional to each country’s capacity” both stem from the literature 
on distributive justice. The proportional allocation mechanism is grounded in the maxim of 
proportional equality: “Equals should be treated equally, and unequals, unequally in proportion 
to relevant similarities and differences” (Aristotle cited in Gätcher and Riedl 2006, 590 and 
Moulin 2002, 291). BHH expect to find support for proportional allocation, as previous 
research suggest that people are attracted to this idea. Among others, they refer to Herrero, 
Moreno-Ternero, and Ponti (2010), where the proportional rule was proven to be favored by 
the vast majority of respondents in their experimental study of conflicting claims. It also 
performed very well in describing the choices of the respondents in a questionnaire study 
conducted by Bosmans and Schokkaert (2009). The equal allocation mechanism is grounded 
in the principle of numerical equality. It may be attractive to some respondents because of its 
simplicity and general familiarity with this principle. BHH’s survey design, which will be 
described in chapter 3, consist of a set of randomly assigned manipulations where some of the 
respondents are presented with the numerical consequences of each allocation mechanism. The 
respondents preferring the option resulting in the lowest number of asylum seekers could then 
easily pick the alternative showing the lowest number. This way, the authors seek to identify 
which force would override the other: consequentialist or normative considerations (Bansak, 
Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a, 2-3).  
 
The results from their survey experiment is as follows. In the baseline group, most Europeans 
(72%) support a proportional distribution of asylum seekers among countries. The support for 
this mechanism ranges from 58% in Germany to 87% in Greece. This is surprising, they say, 
as most countries would receive more asylum seekers than today. Only 18% prefer the country 
of first entry, which has been status quo since the 1990s. Only 10% prefer an equal allocation 
(2017a, 3). The results from the condition given policy information is virtually identical to the 
baseline group. Prompting the respondents with numerical consequences, on the other hand, 
has an important impact on the support for proportional allocation. If the consequence of 
proportional allocation is a reduction in the number of applications to their country, support for 
this mechanism increases. If the consequences imply higher responsibility for their country, 
support for proportional allocation decreases. The results from BHH’s study suggest that 
consequentialist considerations play a major role in shaping preferences for allocation of 
asylum applicants. However, a majority of respondents (56%) still prefer proportional 
allocation even after having been presented with the numerical consequences of such a policy 




cooperation among European countries, and that this has important implications for theory and 
policy. As long as the burden- and responsibility-sharing is fairly shared across Europe “voters 
would tolerate an increase in the number of asylum seekers allocated to their own country” 
(Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2017a, 5). Data presented by BHH also show public 
support for increasing the number of applicants granted asylum in the respondent’s own 
country. They (2017a, 1) say that “across the 15 European countries we surveyed, not a single 
one has a majority population willing to accept more asylum seekers with open arms”. This is 
emphasized to show that even though states could collectively benefit from coordinating 
humanitarian protection in order to avoid chaotic refugee flows, each country also has an 
incentive to free ride.  
 
The main conclusion, and finding to be replicated in this study, is: A majority of citizens prefer 
proportional allocation of asylum applicants over the status quo allocation mechanism and this 
majority support persists even among respondents who were made aware that moving to 
proportional allocation would increase the number of asylum seekers allocated to their own 
country. Informing respondents that moving to proportional allocation would mean an increase 
in the number of asylum applicants allocated to their country, is expected to lead to a decrease 
in the support for this mechanism. Support for proportional allocation is expected to increase 
when the consequence of moving to this mechanism is a reduction of applicants to the 
respondent’s country. To sum up, informing the respondents about the consequences of the 
allocation mechanism has an important impact, but a majority would still prefer proportional 
allocation over the Dublin regulation.  
 
2.2.4 The Refugee Crisis’ Effect on Public Opinion 
National and international crises are often referred to as “exogenous shocks”. Such events often 
lead to shifts in public opinion. This is the theoretical starting point for Nordø and Ivarsflaten 
(2019) when they examine the effects of the Refugee Crisis on public opinion toward 
immigration.  
 
The first studies based on the refugee crisis have been indecisive, with some public 
opinion researchers referring to the absence of attitudinal effects of the refugee crisis 
(Esaiasson et al., 2016; Hellevik and Hellevik, 2017), and other researchers of electoral 
competition mainly concluding that the influx of asylum seekers shifted electoral 




2019). Despite the inconclusive empirical field, the theoretical expectation is clear. The 
dominant group threat theory postulates that out-groups are likely to generate a sense 
of threat for ingroup members, leading them to express exclusionary attitudes 
(Albertson and Gadarian, 2015a; Forbes, 1997). (Nordø and Ivarsflaten 2019, 64).  
 
Nordø and Ivarsflaten’s (2019) results confirm this theoretical expectation, but they also 
suggest that this negative effect had a limited duration. They use the label “perturbation effect”, 
introduced by Sniderman et al. (2019), as they show that attitudes reverted back to “baseline 
levels” after the refugee crisis was under control (Nordø and Ivarsflaten 2019, 65-66). 
Hangartner et al. (2019) investigate the effect of the 2015 Refugee Crisis on attitudes, policy 
preferences and engagement. They find the following:  
 
direct exposure to refugee arrivals induces sizable and lasting increases in natives’ 
hostility toward refugees, immigrants, and Muslim minorities; support for restrictive 
asylum and immigration policies; and political engagement to effect such exclusionary 
policies (2019, 442, emphasis added).  
 
This study, claiming to identify long-term consequences, was done one year after the massive 
influx to Greece stopped with the implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement of March 2016 
(2019, 444). This means that Nordø and Ivarsflaten’s finding is not contradictory to Hangartner 
et al. (2019) and other earlier published articles, as any possible perturbation effect had not yet 
reached baseline after the shock when the other studies were conducted. This thesis will append 
this line of research in that it compares data collected toward the end of the Refugee Crisis to 
data collected 3.5 years later. Any difference in the attitudes toward a common European 
system for the reception of asylum applicants might possibly be ascribed to the effects this 
exogenous shock had on public opinion.  
 
2.3 Why Replicate the BHH Study   
First of all, cumulation, to build upon existing research by adding new material, is a central 
part of scientific activity. Cumulation is facilitated by three elements: standardization, 
replication and transparency. Replication takes place at the beginning of a study as a way of 
verifying findings and after a study to test the validity (Gerring 2011, 91-92). The knowledge 
BHH’s study contributes to is one of several important foundations for ongoing policy design. 




contribution in itself: “Replication is important simply because there is agreement among 
scientists that replication is important” (Schmidt 2009, 584).  
 
Second, this replication study allows for a tougher test of BHH’s conclusions. Their study from 
2016 was based on one single data collection. In a cross-national study, they found that a 
majority of Europeans would support a proportional allocation of asylum seekers. Based on 
comparison across countries, they suggest that this support persists even when respondents are 
made aware that it would mean more asylum applicants to their country. This replication study 
contributes with a new data collection allowing for comparison within one of the countries in 
BHH’s sample. At the time when BHH collected data for their study, the proportional 
allocation alternative would mean less asylum applications to Norway than status quo. Because 
Norway was one of the major European reception countries per capita in 2015, the Norwegian 
respondents in the original survey that were exposed to the numerical consequences did not 
have to make a trade-off between consequentialist considerations and norms of distributive 
justice. The alternative based on proportional allocation was the option entailing the lowest 
number of applicants to Norway. As shown by Table 2.1, the consequences of the 
“proportional”-alternative would lead to 800 asylum applications less than what status quo was 
in 2015. Today, the situation is different. The number of asylum applications Norway received 
relative to other European countries in 2018 is much lower than the relative number in 2015. 
Norwegian respondents actually have to make a sharp trade-off between consequentialist 
considerations and norms of distributive justice when they choose which allocation mechanism 
they prefer. The fact that the same study can be conducted again in 2019 with this trade-off 
included, without breaking the rule of no deception, calls for an interesting replication. A 
second data collection within one country will shed more light on the original author’s 
theoretical assumptions. 
 
Table 2.1 | Numerical Consequences by Each Allocation Method, Norway 2015 and 2018 
Number of Asylum Applicants  Status Quo Same for All Proportional 
2015  31,115 43,223 30,330 
2018  2,700 20,800 10,100 
Source: 2015 data from Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2017b, 35). 2018 data from 
Eurostat (2019a). Further details concerning the distribution key for calculating the 




A third reason for replicating this study is to test Tomz’ (2004) two-factor theory. BHH’s cross-
national comparison showed that informing the respondents of the consequences had a clear 
impact on the support for proportional allocation. This is line with Tomz’ theory: “preferences 
of citizens vary systematically with their exposure to the adjustment costs and reputational 
benefits of compliance”. I can test this effect through within-country comparison. The 
respondents are given different numerical consequences within the same sample and context 
in the new replication data. This allows for testing the effect of both higher and less costs 
implied for their country, as well as no exposure to the implied costs. 
 
In addition, the situation in which BHH’s data was collected was extraordinary, “at the height 
of the European refugee crisis” (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a, 5). Thus, there 
is some additional uncertainty attached to whether the findings will be replicated in more 
ordinary circumstances. An emerging literature has strived to understand the effects of the 
refugee crisis on people’s attitudes, and most of them are pointing toward negative effects (e.g. 
Bjånesøy 2019b; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017; Dinas et al. 2019; Hangartner et al. 2019; 
Mader and Schoen 2019). This replication study offers a better understanding of the potentially 
important contextual differences between the original study and the replication study. 
 
2.4 Hypotheses 
The object of this thesis is to find out whether citizens support a European system of 
responsibility-sharing for the reception of asylum applicants even if that means accepting more 
applicants. This is pursued through three forms of replication. Each is laid out in different 
sections throughout the thesis. First; the verification, second; the direct replication, and third; 
the extended replication. In this section, hypotheses involving precise measures for each will 
be presented in turn.  
 
Before the hypotheses are presented, it is important to establish exactly what BHH base their 
conclusion on, as the basis of the replication must be the same as the original study. A closer 
look at the support for proportional allocation captured by BHH is expedient. The overall 
conclusion of the original study was:  
 
A large majority supports an allocation that is proportional to each country’s capacity 
over the status quo policy of allocation based on the country of first entry. This majority 




respondents who were made aware that moving to proportional allocation would 
increase the number of asylum seekers allocated to their own country (Bansak, 
Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a, 1, emphasis added).   
 
A crucial element for the discussion of the hypotheses for the replication is to clarify what 
“weakened but persists” mean in actual numbers. One interpretation is that “majority support” 
simply mean more than 50% of the respondents – absolute majority. An alternative 
interpretation is that it means more support than the status quo allocation mechanism. Table 
2.2 shows the support for proportional allocation in each treatment group for all the 15 countries 
in the original data, as reported in their supplementary information (Bansak, Hainmueller, and 
Hangartner 2017b, 30-33). Among the groups that received information about the 
consequences, only half the countries surveyed had a majority population that would support 
proportional allocation. However, as evident from Table 2.2 the pooled support for proportional 
allocation ranges from 55% to 72% support. The support for proportional allocation is thus 
more than 50% in all treatment groups when pooled across the countries surveyed. Even among 
the respondents that got to see the implied numbers, an absolute majority would prefer 
proportional allocation when all countries are pooled. This is line with what BHH state in their 
article. When discussing the results for respondents who were assigned to the consequence 
treatment, they highlight two key findings:  
 
First, prompting respondents with the consequences clearly has an important impact on 
support for proportional allocation (…) Second, even when respondents see the implied 
numbers, a majority of 56% of respondents still prefer proportional allocation, despite 
the fact that it would increase the number of asylum seekers for most countries (Bansak, 
Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a, 4). 
 
The basis for BHH conclusion that “this majority support is weakened but persists” is thus the 
average of the pooled results for group 3 and 4 in their data material. This will form the basis 






Table 2.2 | Support for Proportional Allocation, All Countries in the Original Data 






















Germany  57.92 62.57 68.73 67.72 
Hungary 76.22 74.03 91.27 87.62 
Sweden 64.21 62.38 71.80 74.26 
Austria 69.75 68.31 88.99 79.07 
Norway 71.99 64.57 74.97 73.71 
Switzerland  79.34 73.13 62.04 58.11 
Denmark  72.12 65.44 49.37 54.75 
Netherlands  70.32 75.04 45.24 42.84 
Greece 87.38 86.91 85.04 71.99 
Czech 
Republic  
68.22 61.18 29.08 25.25 
Italy 78.74 64.15 42.47 35.22 
Poland  72.14 72.49 33.99 36.03 
Spain  80.08 72.77 45.46 47.39 
France  76.42 74.56 47.80 44.11 
United 
Kingdom 
60.79 57.58 31.03 27.95 
Pooled  72.07 68.83 57.53 55.36 
Source: Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2017b, 30-33).  
Note: Green indicates majority support. The dashed horizontal line separates the countries that 
would see an increase versus a decrease when moving from the status quo to proportional 
allocation. The table shows the weighted estimates of percentage support for proportional 
allocation. 
 
2.4.1 Verification  
Before collecting new data, a verification of BHH’s results is required. A verification involves 
using the same data in order to check another researcher’s reported results (Herrnson 1995, 
453). The data collected in Norway by BHH is analyzed in isolation from the other country 
data. These results will form the basis for judging whether the hypotheses for the direct 
replication are supported or not. The verification of the data collected in Norway is expected 
to show the same results as those put in bold in Table 2.2. As the Norwegian respondents were 




(“even if that means more applicants to Norway”) cannot be tested in the verification. The 
hypotheses for the first part of the study are formulated as follows:  
 
H0study1: The support among Norwegians for proportional allocation of asylum 
applicants match the results reported in the original study. 
H1: The verification of the data collected in Norway for the original study deviates from 
the reported data.   
 
H0study1 will only be supported and the verification be judged as successful should the 
verification show the exact same results as reported by BHH, presented in bold in Table 2.2.  
 
2.4.2 Direct Replication  
After the verification, an analysis of independently collected data is used to study the same 
problem as the original study. Parts of BHH’s study will be repeated. This is called a 
replication. A replication allows to see whether data was collected properly and whether 
generalizations are supported when tested on a different sample and at a different time 
(Herrnson 1995, 452). The results from the direct replication will be compared to the 
verification data obtained in study 1. 
 
Group A in the replication study equals “group 2” in the original study. This group is labelled 
“No numerical consequences”. Among the Norwegian respondents in this treatment group 65% 
preferred the proportional allocation. Given that my survey is carried out using the exact same 
treatment, and the results are compared to a sample obtained from the same population, I expect 
to find support for H0study2. The only difference between the two studies should be that my 
sample is different, and that the data are collected 3.5 years later. The differences in the samples 
will be accounted for in the section on data material in the next chapter. When sample weights 
are employed, the difference in the results are expected to be explained by the contextual 
background of the data collection. 
 
Group B equals “group 4” in the original study. This group is labelled “Numerical 
consequences no trade-off”. When the Norwegian respondents were presented with the 
consequences of the different arrangements in 2016, 74% supported a proportional allocation. 




BHH’s study is expected to be explained by the time period that the data was collected in 
should H0study2 not be supported. The direct replication does not allow to test for the second 
part of the research question either.  
 
H0study2: The treatment effect of prompting respondents with consequence numbers with 
no trade-off is within the 95% confidence intervals of the support among Norwegians 
reported in the original study.   
H2: The treatment effect of prompting respondents with consequence numbers with no 
trade-off deviates from the effect in the original data.  
 
A successful direct replication is indicated by a treatment effect within a 95% normality-based 
confidence interval of the results for Norway in the replicated groups in the original data. The 
treatment effect is expected to be positive. The exact support and corresponding confidence 
intervals are presented in Table 2.3  
 
Table 2.3 | Levels of Support for Proportional Allocation, Original Data 
  Support for proportional 
allocation (95% CI) 
Direct replication 
Group 1, Norway 64.57% (58.8, 70.34) 
Group 2, Norway 73.71% (68.4, 79.02) 
 Treatment effect Positive  
Extended replication Group 3 & 4, pooled 56.45 % (50.47, 62.43) 
 Treatment effect Negative 
Source: Hainmueller (2017).  
Note: CI based on N = 264 in each group, total N = 1057 in the replication.  
 
2.4.3 Extended Replication 
At the time when BHH conducted their study, Norway were among the five countries surveyed 
that would see a decrease rather than an increase when moving from the status quo to 
proportional allocation. As the situation has changed, I now have the opportunity to test 
whether this finding holds when the trade-off occurs in a country where it did not occur in the 




The results from the extended replication will be compared to the average of the pooled results 
for group 3 and 4 in the original data.  
 
The extended replication groups are very much like group B, but the consequence numbers are 
different from the original study to reflect today’s situation. They are labelled “Numerical 
consequences sharp trade-off” and “Numerical consequences sharp trade-off, UN info”. The 
fourth treatment is designed to prompt respondents to consider the fairness of proportional 
allocation, and thus more support for this alternative is expected compared to the other groups. 
I expect more support for proportional allocation in group D compared to group C.  
 
H0study3: The treatment effect of prompting respondents with consequence numbers with 
a sharp trade-off is within the 95% confidence intervals of the pooled results for the 
average of group 3 and 4 reported in the original study.    
H3: The treatment effect of prompting respondents with consequence numbers with a 
sharp trade-off deviates from the effect captured in group 3 and 4 in the original pooled 
data.  
 
A successful extended replication is indicated by a treatment effect within a 95% normality-
based confidence interval of the pooled results from group 3 and 4 in the original data. The 
treatment effect is expected to be negative, but still constitute majority support. The exact level 
of support and corresponding confidence intervals were reported in Table 2.3. Support for 
H0study3 would confirm that the overall finding in the original study applies to Norway in 2019. 
This would strengthen BHH’s claim that citizens support the principle of responsibility-sharing 
even if it entails a higher cost for their country in form of more asylum applicants. 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter started by briefly discussing the current CEAS-regulations, Norway’s negotiating 
position on this matter, and other European countries stance. Political leaders seem to believe 
that increasing the number of asylum applicants received by one’s country is against the public 
opinion. This might be one of the explanations for why reaching a consensus on a reform of 





The literature review was then presented in four parts. The first part concern studies that 
investigate attitudes toward immigration more generally. Attitudes toward immigration have 
largely been examined within two distinct schools of political theory: The psychological threat-
perspective and the economic interest-perspective. Despite distinct explanatory models, the 
conclusions reached in both schools point toward concerns about cultural impact (Hainmueller 
and Hopkins 2014, 24).  
 
Whether public opinion matters more generally for foreign policy, is a well-explored topic in 
the field of international relations. Some say it does and others say it does not. Exploring this 
link is a normatively important task (Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2019, 119-120). The 
second part of the literature review presented some research on public opinion toward 
international agreements. The nature of Tomz’ (2004) two-factor theory for policy choice is 
that ordinary citizens reach one conclusion regarding international agreements based on 
normative principles, but often a different conclusion when the consequences implied for them 
are made clear.  
 
Normative principles in relation to international agreements is a less developed school of 
thought in the literature on public attitudes toward immigration policy, but there is one 
important contribution. The third section of the literature review treated the study replicated in 
this thesis. Based on data from a big, experimental survey conducted in 2016, Bansak, 
Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2017a) show that there is majority support among Europeans for 
a distribution mechanism allocating asylum applications across Europe proportional to each 
country’s capacity. This majority support persists even when respondents are made aware that 
moving to such an allocation mechanism would result in more applications to their country.  
 
The fourth part of the literature review highlighted that findings regarding the effects of the 
refugee crisis on public opinion are pointing in different directions. Most studies find that the 
refugee crisis had a negative effect on people’s views on immigration and attitudes toward 
immigrants. However, recent data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel show a perturbation 
effect. That is a move away from stable attitudes in response to a sudden exogenous shock. 
After a considerable amount of time has passed, citizen go back to their stable attitudes (Nordø 
and Ivarsflaten 2019). Like Nordø and Ivarsflaten’s study, this thesis is also limited to explore 
the Norwegian context. The data collected for this study might either lend further support for 




public opinion: That it led to more hostile and exclusionary views toward asylum applicants. 
On the other hand, it may lend support for the findings made by BHH in 2016 and thus also 
support Nordø and Ivarsflaten’s recent finding of a perturbation effect.  
 
There are particularly four striking reasons for conducting a replication of BHH’s study: First, 
the combination of the important findings elucidated by this study and the fact that this has 
only been done once, makes a replication of this study valuable in itself. Second, as the 
circumstances has changed drastically over the course of the 3.5 years since BHH conducted 
their survey, the current situation allows for a tougher test of their conclusion. Their 
conclusions are drawn based on cross-national comparisons. This study can test the same 
hypothesis within one country. Third, as some respondents in the replication data are prompted 
with numerical consequences involving no trade-off, whereas other are faced with a sharp 
trade-off, Tomz’ two-factor theory can be tested on respondents in the very same survey. 
Lastly, BHH’s data collection took place in the very special context of the European refugee 
crisis. This backdrop might have influenced public opinion.  
 
In the section on hypotheses, exact measures for evaluating whether the three forms of 
replications are to be considered successful or not were laid out. The measures for the 
verification are based on the results presented for Norway in BHH’s supplementary material. 
The measures for the direct replication are based on the results from the verification, but only 
the replicated groups (group 2 and 4 in the original data) are considered. The verification and 
direct replication do not allow to test for the second part of the research question, study 3 is 
designed for that. BHH’s conclusion that the majority support for proportional allocation 
persists even when respondents are made aware of the consequences it would entail for their 
country is based on the pooled results. The measures for judging the extended replication are 




3. Method and Study Design   
This chapter will begin by presenting the experimental survey design developed by BHH. The 
second section describes the general attributes of population-based survey experiments. 
Section 3 deals with the topic of replication. The procedure for this thesis will then be 
accounted for in section four. Section 5 introduce the data employed in the analysis. The 
original data are reported first, followed by the replication data collected exclusively for this 
thesis. Finally, whether or not to use sample weights in this type of analyses is expounded on. 
 
3.1 The Original Study’s Design and Method  
A detailed examination of the original survey experiment is expedient as this lay the foundation 
for the rest of the thesis. The data for the original study were collected from late February to 
early March 2016. 18,000 citizens of 15 European countries were asked about their preferences 
for allocation of asylum seekers. The 15 countries included in the original study represent 
traditional, major powers in the European Union as well as new member states. Both members 
of the EU and non-members that take part in the CEAS were included. The sample included 
countries with few as well as many asylum seekers, and both border and interior countries. 
Approximately 1,200 eligible voters were surveyed in each country. The survey was mostly 
conducted online, but also included some computer-assisted telephone interviews (Bansak, 
Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a, 1, 5; 2017b, 2).  
 
The treatment groups constitute the four independent variables of the study. The dependent 
variable is the preference for allocation of asylum seekers. In each of the 15 countries surveyed, 
BHH’s respondents were randomly split in four groups. Each group was assigned to one of 
four conditions. Table 3.1 provides a schematic overview of their experimental design. Before 
answering the question, all respondents were given the following introductory text:  
 
Now, we would like to get your thoughts on policies toward asylum seekers in Europe 
(i.e. people who left their home countries and request legal safe-haven in Europe on the 
basis that they fear persecution in their home countries). European countries have 
adopted common regulations for granting asylum to refugees. We are interested to 






The respondents were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In group 1, the 
baseline condition, respondents were asked for their preferences without any additional 
intervention:  
 
In your opinion, how should the number of asylum applications per country be 
determined?  
The number of asylum applications allocated to each European country should be  
 based on the country of first entry (e.g. asylum seekers are required to submit their 
asylum application in the European country in which they initially arrive). 
 the same for every European country (e.g. asylum seekers are allocated such that each 
European country receives the same number of asylum applications). 
 proportional to the country’s capacity (e.g. asylum seekers are allocated to each 
European country depending on its population, GDP, unemployment rate, and number 
of past applications).” 
 
In group 2 respondents were informed of the status quo policy and policy relevant arguments:  
 
[Baseline] + Under current regulations, asylum seekers are generally required to submit 
their applications in the country through which they first entered Europe (i.e. the 
‘country of first entry’). The goal behind this policy is to maximize efficiency. 
However, some people have pointed out that the current policy puts an unfair burden 
on border countries that are more likely to serve as entry points for asylum seekers. 
Accordingly, they recommend allocating asylum applications either equally across all 
countries or based on each country’s capacity. 
 
In group 3, respondents were informed about the number of asylum seekers that their country 
would receive under each allocation, here exemplified by the numbers for Norway. The 
numbers were based off the actual number of asylum applications reported in 2015 by Eurostat 
(Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2017b, 5). This group did not receive information about 
the status quo policy or relevant arguments, just the following:  
 
 [Baseline] + This would mean approximately 31,115 applications allotted to Norway. 
 [Baseline] + This would mean approximately 43,223 applications allotted to Norway. 





Group 4 were given [baseline] + [policy-relevant information about the different allocation 
mechanisms] + [the number of asylum seekers that their country would receive under each 
allocation].  
 
Table 3.1 | The Experimental Design of the Original Study  














Introduction Short introductory text 
















 based on the country of first entry (e.g. asylum seekers are required 
to submit their asylum application in the European country in which 
they initially arrive). 
 the same for every European country (e.g. asylum seekers are 
allocated such that each European country receives the same number of 
asylum applications). 
 proportional to the country’s capacity (e.g. asylum seekers are 
allocated to each European country depending on its population, GDP, 
unemployment rate, and number of past applications). 
Consequence 
treatment  
   This would mean approximately 
31,100 applications allotted to 
Norway. 
 This would mean approximately 
43,200 applications allotted to 
Norway. 
 This would mean approximately 
30,300 applications allotted to 
Norway. 
Source: Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2017a, 5).  
Note: N = total across all countries surveyed. Randomization was automated, thus the 
investigators were blinded to the treatment assignment allocation during the survey 
administration. The conditions in the original study will be labelled with numbers throughout 






3.2 Population-Based Survey Experiments 
BHH’s survey is designed with different manipulations that are randomly distributed to groups 
from the same sample representing a population. This approach is called a population-based 
survey experiment. The decisive feature of fully randomized experiments is internal validity. 
Equivalent groups are exposed to different stimuli, so when the groups are compared any 
differentiation can be explained by the stimulus. Experiments are thus well-suited for studying 
causal relationships. However, studying the effect of a binary variable on respondents’ choices 
is normally not the purpose of sophisticated modern political science research. Instead, the 
logic of experimental control and high internal validity is utilized to generate experimental data 
relevant for the research question. This is achieved through a cautiously developed survey 
design (Lijphart 1971, 683; Morton and Williams 2008, 4; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002, 
7). The generalizability of experiments is normally low, and this is the strength of data collected 
through population-based surveys. Representative public opinion surveys feature high external 
validity among the population from which the sample is drawn. By combining survey and 
experiment, the data collection method employed in this thesis allows for utilizing the strengths 
of both methods, and at the same time eliminate many of the weaknesses they hold when carried 
out individually (Mutz 2011, 1; Sniderman and Grob 1996, 378; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 
2002, 5).  
 
 “By simultaneously ensuring internal validity and maximizing the capacity for external 
validity, population-based experiments may be unmatched in their ability to advance social 
scientific knowledge” (Mutz 2011, 157). Population-based survey experiments are particularly 
advantageous for research concerning policy-relevant issues. Research with a clear target and 
where the applicability is specified, is valuable when the purpose of the study is to influence 
policymakers. Mutz (2011, 158) highlights that more work than what might be presumed at 
first glance is necessary in order to profit from the advantages emphasized above. Both the 
design and execution of the data collection requires major effort.  
 
Despite high expectations toward this method, population-based survey experiments are not 
flawless, and many of the standard data collection challenges remain. The bias and weaknesses 






3.3 Replication Study  
Adding a brick here and another brick there without much regard for the space 
between them may result in an unstable building with weak parts, leakages and 
unnecessary parts that will require a major effort later on to effect their removal 
(Schmidt 2009, 591).  
 
This thesis is composed of three essential forms of replication, which will be explained in the 
following. By building directly on BHH’s article, this thesis aims to be a brick contributing to 
a stable building of research on how the public view a common European asylum system. The 
first part of this section will sort the different terms that can be put under the umbrella of 
reanalysis, explain what a replication study is, and the functions it can serve. The second part 
will describe the criteria for a replication and how these are met. This section is largely based 
on Brandt et al.’s (2014, 219) 36-question guide to the Replication Recipe and Schmidt’s (2009, 
585) functional approach to replication.   
 
3.3.1 Definitions and Aims   
A secondary analysis uses the same data to study a different question. A reanalysis is defined 
as a study of the same problem as an original study that may or may not use the same data. 
Verifications and replications are both forms of reanalysis (Herrnson 1995, 452). A replication 
is “a repetition of a research procedure to check the accuracy or truth of the findings reported”. 
While a direct replication is a repetition of an experimental procedure, a conceptual replication 
is a repetition of a test of a hypothesis with a different experimental set-up (Schmidt 2009, 
582). Direct replications are very rare. In certain terms, they do not exist at all. Rosenthal (1991) 
suggests the label relative replication for any replication within the behavioral sciences (2009, 
585). Brandt et al. (2014) define close replication as a study aiming to “recreate a study as 
closely as possible, so that ideally the only differences between the two are the inevitable ones 
(e.g., different participants)”. I will use the term “direct” to describe the repetition of BHH’s 
study in this replication, under the condition that no such thing as an exact replication exists. 
The closest publications to a direct replication you likely will find is a follow-up study, also 
known as extension studies. Extension studies directly replicate parts of an earlier study, 
and then additional condition(s) are included in the experiment, or an additional experiment 
can test a new hypothesis (2009, 588-590). I will use the label “extended replication” for the 





Confirmatory power is the main reason for conducting a replication. This implies five specific 
functions, as presented in Table 3.2. This scheme is included to give an impression of what and 
why differences are introduced in experimental replications. It is not to be interpreted in a literal 
way, as applied science deviate from theoretical frameworks, e.g. it is not always possible to 
keep variables constant (Schmidt 2009, 588). The three first functions are to control for fraud, 
sampling error (chance result) and artifacts (lack of internal validity). Replications may also be 
conducted to generalize results to a larger or to a different population and verify the underlying 
hypothesis of the earlier experiment. The two last functions go further than the narrow 
understanding of a replication. Instead of “just verifying”, generalizing results and verifying 
the underlying hypothesis aim at providing a deeper understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms. Cumulative science often leaves a space between the earlier research and the new 
contribution. Replications can fill this gap if they are performed explicitly and systematically 
(Schmidt 2009, 594). The replication conducted for this thesis aims to be done in such an 
explicit and systematic manner. The next part offers a detailed account of how this is done.  
 
Table 3.2 | Description of Various Functions of Replications  
 Functions 




Variables Fraud Sampling 
error 
Artifacts 
Primary information focus 
(immaterial) 
Constant Constant Constant Constant Constant 
Primary information focus 
(material) 
Constant Constant Constant Constant Changes 
Selection of respondents Constant Constant* Constant Changes Constant 
Contextual background Changes+ Constant Changes Constant Changes 
Constitution of the 
dependent variable 
Constant Constant Changes Constant Changes 
Demands met (more or less) Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 2&3 - 
Source: Schmidt (2009, 586).  
Note: +changes here refer to the personnel involved in the study. *apply the same procedure to 






3.3.2 Procedure  
In designing the replication study, the original authors were contacted and Professor 
Hangartner encouraged the replication by providing me with the Norwegian translation of the 
original survey. The main hypothesis for this study is that the finding will be the same as in the 
original study. The nature of the effect and exact expectations for the results were presented in 
the preceding chapter in the section on hypotheses. As the policy situation is the same today, 
the meaning of the stimuli in the original study and direct replication are the same. For the 
extended replication, the meaning of the stimuli is different in the replication compared to the 
Norwegian respondents in the original data, as they are now faced with a trade-off between 
normative and consequentialist considerations. It is however the same as the overall theoretical 
expectations for the original study. Consequently, the results from the direct replication will be 
compared to the results from the verification, and the results from the extended replication will 
be compared to the pooled results from the original data.  
 
In his account of the functional approach to replication, Schmidt (2009, 587) emphasize that 
differences have to be introduced as an exact replication would have no confirmatory power 
(Collins (1985) cited in Schmidt 2009, 585). The design of a replication study depends on 
which function it is intended for. He (2009, 588) compares the transition from the original 
experiment to the replication experiment to that of a classic experiment: only one variable 
should be varied, whereas all others have to be constant to deduce a causal influence of the 
independent variable on the dependent. The difference between the replication and the original 
study is minimal, but some changes are inevitable. In order to judge whether the deviations 
from the original study are justified, readers may study Table 3.3. The variables changed and 
functions intended to be met by each of the three studies this thesis is comprised of, can be 
studied in Table 3.2. Schmidt stresses that keeping a variable constant, as preferable by this 
scheme, is not always possible. This is important as the reason for failure to replicate findings 
is less clear. Please note that study 2 and 3 do not fully meet the demands for “selection of 
respondents” and “contextual background”. Differences in the replication results from the 








Table 3.3 | Adjustments made from BHH’s original study  









“Hear” is replaced 
with “ask”:  
 
«Nå ønsker vi å høre 
om tankene dine»  
has been replaced 
with «Nå ønsker vi å 
spørre om tankene 
dine».  
 
«BNP» in the 
response options has 
been elaborated on by 
spelling out “general 





The year the 
numbers reflect 
has been added: 
Instead of saying 
«Dette betyr at 
omtrent X 
søknader tildeles 
Norge», it says  
«I 2015 betød det 
at omtrent X 







treatment has been 
updated to reflect 
the most recent 
proposal by the 
EC, and numbers 
are based on 2018. 
Condition 4 








Updated numbers to 









suggested by the 
original authors. 
Procedure All conditions Different 
Questions are part of a completely different 
survey with a different overall theme. 
Location All conditions Exact 
Except the original survey “to a lesser 
extent, also [used] computer-assisted 
telephone interviews”. 
Remuneration All conditions Different 
“The modal incentive across all countries in 
our study was EUR 2.00 for a median 
length of interview (LOI) of 20.5 minutes” 
The replication had no remuneration. 
Participant 
populations 
All conditions Exact 
Based on the population of eligible voters in 
Norway. 
What differences between the original study and 
this study might be expected to influence the size 
and/or direction of the effect: 
The contextual background and the updated 
consequence numbers for group C and D. 
I have taken the following steps to test whether 
the differences listed above will influence the 
outcome of my replication attempt: 
The adjustments made for this study are well 
grounded theoretically and empirically in chapter 2 
and methodologically in chapter 3.  
Source: Based on the section “Documenting Differences between the Original and Replication 





In study 1 all variables are kept constant to meet the function of controlling for fraud or human 
error. In study 2 and 3 the primary information focus and population is the same, but the sample 
is different. The contextual background is also different. The selection of participants is not 
exactly “constant” nor “changed”. When the replication is conducted at a different time, this 
variable will in a way always be changed, as Schmidt puts it:  
 
Because some time has passed between the original study and its replication the 
participants may have slightly changed their pattern of reactions to threatening stimuli. 
This might be because of the experience of the experimental situation of the original 
study, but it might also be because they have had other threatening experiences since 
then. So, although the same participants have been invited again, they are no longer the 
same people (Schmidt 2009, 585). 
 
The samples are not obtained in the same manner in the original and replication data, but as 
entropy balancing is used to analyze the original data, and weights are employed for analyzing 
the replication data, differences in the samples are reduced. The demands for controlling for 
sampling error and artifacts, or generalize the results, are not absolutely met. The constitution 
of the dependent variable is the same for study 2. Study 2 thus meet (more or less) Schmidt’s 
criteria for controlling for sampling error. Study 3 has the same set-up but is obtained using 
different material. Study 3 thus meet (more or less) Schmidt’s criteria for controlling for lack 
of internal validity (artifacts). To meet the fourth function, generalize results, the sample should 
be drawn from a larger or different population according to Schmidt’s functions. This is not 
the purpose of this replication study, rather, study 2 and 3 are designed to see if the results of 
the original study can be generalized to a different context.  
 
The design of these replications does not meet Schmidt’s demands to fulfill the function of 
“verifying hypothesis”. None of these studies can be labelled “conceptual replication” in 
Schmidt’s terms, as that would require a different experimental idea (Schmidt 2009, 587-89). 
As evident from Table 3.2, study 2 and 3 seek to meet multiple functions. The risk of such 
procedures is similar to that of a conceptual replication: “If such a replication is successful, the 
benefit is great, but if it fails the results are almost worthless. This is because it remains unclear 
whether the failure is because of misconception in the new experimental set-up.” (Hendrick 





3.4 Design  
In this section, the design for each of the three replication components will be presented in turn. 
Study 1, the verification, was executed using the replication data available online. The 
remaining parts of the replication, study 2 and 3, are carried out using independently collected 
data. The process of obtaining original data for this thesis involved a thorough examination of 
the policy debates that arose during and in the aftermath of the European refugee crisis. The 
political reactions and consequences on the international, European and Norwegian level will 
be accounted for in the section on the extended replication. Before moving into the policy 
debates, an introduction to the refugee crisis is expedient. The independent variables in the 
analyses presented in the next chapter are the four experimental conditions. They will be 
carefully accounted for in the following. Some remarks regarding the dependent variable are 
made first. 
 
3.4.1 Dependent variable   
In the pursuit of an answer to the research question, “support for a system of responsibility-
sharing” is operationalized as support for proportional allocation of asylum applications. The 
dependent variable is the same across all three studies as in the original study. The respondents 
were given three response options to the question “How do you think the number of asylum 
applications per country should be determined?”: Based on the country of first entry, the same 
number for every European country, or proportional to the country’s capacity. The exact 
wording of the response options can be studied in Table 3.4, which contain the replication 
survey in its entirety.  
 
The new consequence numbers for “proportional to the country’s capacity” are based on actual 
numbers from 2018 and are calculated through the distribution scheme laid out in the section 
on policy shifts in Europe due to the refugee crisis in section 3.4.42. The numbers for “based 
on the country of arrival” and “equal allocation for all European countries” are derived from 
Eurostat (2019a). The same number-option is an untenable alternative, as BHH’s study show; 
very few would support an allocation based on numerical equality. Nevertheless, it is included 
in order to conduct a true replication. As the main focus of the original article is on the support 
for proportional allocation, a dichotomous variable will be used in the analysis of treatment 
                                                 




effects. “Based on the country of arrival” is not sharing of responsibility, and “equal allocation” 
will most likely have negligible support, so for the binary dependent variable, “proportional to 
the country’s capacity” will be coded as 1 and “equal allocation for all European countries” 
and “based on the country of arrival” is coded as 0. The support for all three allocation 
mechanisms will be reported in the fifth section of chapter 4. 
 
3.4.2 Verification  
The verification simply involves an independent analysis of BHH’s data in order to verify their 
findings. Study 1 focuses on the data BHH collected in Norway. Both the code and data were 
made accessible at Harvard Dataverse, with links provided in the original article. It is not 
necessary to perform any regression analysis in order to verify BHH’s findings. The results 
from the cross table are sufficient in order to check whether the reported support for 
proportional allocation in the supplementary material match the data. The results will be 
compared to the data for Norway presented in chapter 2, in the table “Support for Proportional 
Allocation, All Countries in the Original Data”. The verification may be simple, but it is yet 
very important. The other parts of the study are premised upon a successful verification. 
 
3.4.3 Direct replication  
Based on BHH’s article, supplementary material and the Norwegian translation of the original 
survey, I designed a new survey. The study design is presented in Table 3.4. The baseline 
condition in this replication study is exactly like BHH’s group 2. This condition is referred to 
as group A, and labelled “Policy information, no numerical consequences”. This group is 
“informed that allocation based on the country of first entry is the status quo regulation and 
also presented arguments typically used in public debate to justify the various allocations” 
(Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a, 4). I chose to do a direct replication of this group, 
and not their baseline group, as the results from this group were virtually indistinguishable 
from the baseline in the original study, and to minimize the difference between the conditions. 
The second condition in this replication study is exactly as BHH’s group 4. This condition is 
referred to as group B, and labelled “Policy information, numerical consequences no trade-
off”.  This condition is designed “to examine the strength of the normative considerations, (…) 
it explicitly primed respondents’ consequentialist preferences by providing additional 
information about the number of asylum applications that would be assigned to the 




Table 3.4 | Description of Wording of Treatment Conditions, Replication Study  
 Direct replication Extended replication 
 Condition 1:  
(N = 272)  
Condition 2:  
(N = 283)  
Condition 3: 
(N = 243)  
Condition 4:  
(N = 259) 
Introduction We would now like to ask you about your thoughts regarding asylum seekers in 
Europe (i.e. people who have left their homeland and are requesting lawful asylum 
in Europe because they fear persecution in their own homeland). European 
countries have adopted joint regulations for granting asylum to refugees. We are 
interested in your views regarding a number of alternatives within asylum policy 
that are currently being debated. 
 
In accordance with applicable law, asylum seekers, as a general rule, must submit 
an application to the European country in which they first arrive (i.e. “country of 
arrival”). The aim of this policy is to maximise efficiency. Some, however, have 
pointed out that the applicable regulations cause an unfair burden on borderlands 
that increasingly serve as places of arrival for asylum seekers. Therefore, they either 
recommend allocating asylum applications evenly across all countries or based on 
each country's capacity. 
UN 
information 










Question How do you think the number of asylum applications per country should be 
determined? The number of asylum applications allocated to each European 
country should be... 
Response 
options  
 based on the country of arrival (i.e. asylum seekers must submit their 
application to the European country in which they first arrive).  
 equal allocation for all European countries (i.e. asylum seekers are allocated 
so that each European country receives the same number of asylum 
applications).  
 proportional to the country’s capacity (i.e. asylum seekers are allocated to 
the different European countries based on the country’s population and 
financial situation (gross domestic product)).  
Consequence 
numbers  
  This meant that in 2015, 
approximately 31 100 
applications were allocated 
to Norway. 
 This meant that in 2015, 
approximately 43 200 
applications would have 
been allocated to Norway. 
 This meant that in 2015, 
approximately 30 300 
applications would have 
been allocated to Norway. 
 This means that in 2018, 
approximately 2 700 
applications were 
allocated to Norway. 
 This means that in 2018, 
approximately 20 800 
applications would have 
been allocated to Norway. 
 This means that in 2018, 
approximately 10 100 
applications were 
allocated to Norway. 





3.4.4 Extended replication  
Study 3 is the toughest test of BHH’s finding. This part will unveil whether the support for a 
European system of responsibility-sharing for the reception of asylum applicants persists even 
if that means accepting more applicants. As presented in section 2.3, status quo was the option 
with the lowest number of applications allocated to Norway according to the asylum 
application numbers for 2015. Thus, the Norwegian respondents in BHH’s study did not have 
to make a trade-off between normative and consequentialist considerations. With the updated 
numbers based on the situation in 2018, respondent’s normative and consequentialist 
considerations will collide. The respondents in group C and D will have to make a trade-off 
similar to that of the majority of countries in the original study.  
 
The third condition in the replication study is as group B, but with updated numbers to reflect 
today’s situation. These numbers are compiled following the same reasoning as BHH: “To 
make the consequences treatment as realistic as possible, we piped in the actual number of 
asylum applications reported (…) by Eurostat (…)” (2017a, 4). This condition is referred to as 
group C and labelled “Numerical consequences sharp trade-off”. The fourth condition in the 
replication study is as group C, but these respondents are also provided with additional 
information intended to increase the support for the proportional allocation, by emphasizing 
that “in UN-meetings it has been argued that a proportional allocation based on capacity is a 
lot fairer”. “Prompting respondents with such fairness considerations should, if anything, 
further increase support for the proportional allocation” (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 
2017a, 5). This condition is referred to as group D and labelled “Numerical consequences sharp 
trade-off, UN info”.  
 
The approach I take in this thesis, by combining a direct and extended replication in the same 
data collection, is quite unique to my knowledge. The fact that “everybody knows” that 2015 
was an extraordinary year when it comes to asylum applicants, allowed for conducting both a 
direct and an extended replication in the same survey. In doing this, I follow the general 
recommendation of Paul Sniderman (2018) for hypothesis testing through a sequential 
factorial design. He (2018, 266) defines this approach as “a series of experimental trials that 
hold constant the design template but progressively vary the values of the factor(s) being 
manipulated to refine and deepen a line of inquiry”. However, in his article this approach is 




different countries. This is to emphasize the benefits of the minimal cost implied through such 
an approach. Sniderman (2018, 267) then hints that some may indicate that the differences that 
appear from one experiment to the next in his example is due to between-country differences. 
His point is that robust patterns, and not point estimates, are realistic and should be the target 
of repeated experimental trials. Such accusations are avoided in this thesis as data for both 
study 2 and study 3 are collected in the same survey. 
 
In addition to the same material that the direct replication is based on, a careful elaboration on 
data from Eurostat and a thorough examination of the discussions related to the reform of the 
CEAS and formulation of the global compacts, underlie the extended replication. These 
considerations and calculations will be elaborated on in the following subsections. A brief, 
general overview of how the refugee crisis unfolded in Europe is given first, followed by 
Norway’s experience more specifically. I then turn to examine the policy shifts on the global, 
European and Norwegian levels.   
 
3.4.4.1 The “Refugee Crisis”  
In pursuit of confirming BHH’s finding that citizens support a European system of allocating 
asylum applicants proportional to each country’s capacity, the refugee crisis as the contextual 
background of the original study is crucial. The contextual background is expected to be an 
important explanatory variable should the replication attempt fail. The “refugee crisis” is not 
an unvexed term, but as it has become a common term in academia, as well as in the media and 
the public, it seems to be the best label for what will be covered in this explanatory variable. 
In the following, I seek to clarify this term and illuminate why this could be a powerful 
explanation should BHH’s results not be replicated successfully.  
 
Europe received almost 1.4 million asylum applications in 2015. That is more than twice as 
many as the year before. Out of these, 31,100 were filed in Norway. That is almost as many as 
the total number of applications received in the preceding three-year period. The largest share 
of refugees came as a result of the conflict in Syria. As Figure 3.1 shows, the influx of 
immigrants to Europe took off in May 2015 and went back to pre-crisis numbers in December 
2016 (Eurostat 2019a, 2016). This period has been labelled “the refugee crisis” (Bansak, 
Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a; Brekke and Staver 2018; Bygnes 2017; Czymara and 
Schmidt-Catran 2017; Dinas et al. 2019; Gilbert 2015; Heizmann and Ziller 2019; 




all, for many refugees and for countries at Europe’s Southern border the refugee crisis was not 
limited to 2015 and 2016. For the case of Norway, however, the crisis started in August 2015 
and ended in December the same year (Nordø and Ivarsflaten 2019, 64). Figure 3.2 illustrates 
that the sudden growth of asylum applications to Norway was actually limited to a period of 5 
months in 2015. 
 
Figure 3.1 | Asylum Applicants, Europe  
 
Source: Eurostat (2019a).  
Note: Total number (rounded) of asylum 
applications to Europe, January 2013 – 
September 2019.  
 
Figure 3.2 | Asylum Applicants, Norway 
 
Source: Eurostat (2019a). 
Note: Total number (rounded) of asylum 
applications to Norway, January 2013 – 
September 2019.
 
The second reason the label “refugee crisis” is in dispute concerns the system collapse following 
the entry of a number of migrants representing merely 0.3% of the EU’s inhabitants (Heijer, 
Rijpma, and Spijkerboer 2016, 607). Other parts of the world are facing much higher numbers. 
In fact, the global south is housing 86% of all the refugees in the world. With regards to Syrian 
refugees, 94% are hosted by the neighboring countries: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and 
Egypt (Chetail 2016, 585). Prominent scholars argue that the situation was more of a “policy” 
or “management” crisis than anything else. They point out that the problem was the authorities’ 
poor handling of the situation, not the number of asylum seekers. Chetail (2016, 585) quotes 
UN Secretary General at the time, Ban Ki Moon: “This is not a crisis of numbers; it is a crisis 
of solidarity”. Others use the term “legitimation crisis”, explained by Habermas (1988) as a 
crisis that “Results from a widespread perception that state institutions have failed in normative 
terms” (Collyer and King 2016, 2). Regardless of terminology, the way the states and the 
European Union deal with migrants and refugees has to be scrutinized (Brekke and Staver 2018; 




















































































































































































A third clarification that has to be made concerns the terms “refugee” and “migrant”. If we 
accept to call it a crisis, the correct term to put in front of it is refugee, because most of the third-
country nationals that came to Europe in 2015 were asylum seekers and not economic migrants 
(Chetail 2016, 584). The difference between the two terms are highlighted in the following 
explanations compiled by the UNHCR (2016).  
 
Refugees are persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution. (…) Their situation is often 
so perilous and intolerable that they cross national borders to seek safety in nearby 
countries, and thus become internationally recognized as "refugees" with access to 
assistance from States, UNHCR, and other organizations. They are so recognized 
precisely because it is too dangerous for them to return home, and they need sanctuary 
elsewhere. These are people for whom denial of asylum has potentially deadly 
consequences (UNHCR 2016). 
 
Migrants choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but 
mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family 
reunion, or other reasons. Unlike refugees who cannot safely return home, migrants face 
no such impediment to return. If they choose to return home, they will continue to 
receive the protection of their government (UNHCR 2016).  
 
To sum up, the term “refugee” is narrower than “migrant”. An asylum seeker may or may not 
meet the criterion for UNHCR-definition of refugee. An asylum seeker who is not considered 
a refugee, but who is still in need of protection, may be granted asylum on a humanitarian basis 
(Amnesty International i Norge 2020). 
 
Italy faced high inflows of asylum seekers and migrants already in 2014. By June, the number 
of migrants crossing the Central Mediterranean and arriving on Italy’s shores surpassed the 
total number of 2013 (Rayman 2014). The high inflow continued across the Central 
Mediterranean into 2015. During the first four months of 2015, 1,600 migrants had drowned in 
the Mediterranean, following a number of deadly shipwrecks (Brekke and Staver 2018, 2167-
68; Lind 2015). As a response to these events, a new European Agenda for Migration was 
proposed by the Commission in May 2015. It was proposed following consensus in the 
European Parliament in April “for rapid action to save lives and step up EU action”. First, it 
outlines immediate action to this human tragedy. It emphasizes the importance of saving lives 




common approach to resettle people identified by the UNHCR as in clear need of international 
protection are addressed. Key actions for cooperation with third countries and how the EU can 
assist frontline Member States are also laid out. Second, four pillars to manage migration better 
in the long run were discussed. These entail reducing the incentives for irregular migration, 
border management, a common asylum policy and a new policy on legal migration (European 
Commission 2015). The following summer, unprecedented numbers of asylum seekers – mostly 
refugees from Syria – began crossing the Eastern Mediterranean into Greece (Brekke and Staver 
2018, 2167-68). This is when the Crisis really hit. Angela Merkel, in a controversial decision, 
announced in September 2015 that Germany would use the ‘sovereignty clause’ whereby states 
can take the decision to overrule the Dublin regulation. Exercising sovereignty in that scenario 
entails the decision to process the asylum application instead of initiating a Dublin transfer3. At 
this time, Norwegian politicians were under pressure to act, more specifically to “do more” for 
asylum seekers (Brekke and Staver 2018, 2173-74). Germany ended up receiving the by far 
highest total number of asylum applications in Europe during the Crisis (2015-2016), more than 
one million more than number two and three, Hungary and Italy. The Swedes also surely “did 
more” – no other European country received more asylum seekers per capita than Sweden 
(Fratzke 2017, 1). Austria and Hungary also took disproportionately large shares during the 
crisis (Heizmann and Ziller 2019, 2). Norway was number four on the list of countries with the 
highest numbers of asylum applications relative to population (Bjånesøy 2019b, i223). Other 
countries that received a disproportionate share of asylum seekers relative to their size were 
border States in the south and east such as Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Greece. On the other 
hand, some external border countries were free riders receiving very few applications. Among 
these were Spain, Portugal, Poland and the Baltic States (Heijer, Rijpma, and Spijkerboer 2016, 
613).  
 
3.4.4.2 The Refugee Crisis in Norway  
Until 2015, the year 2002 marked the peak of asylum applications to Norway in one year. The 
total number of applications received by Norway in 2002 was 17,480. In 2015 the total number 
was 31,110. From January to March 2015, the number of applications was lower than the 
numbers for the same months of 2014. There was a slight increase in May, mainly due to 
Eritreans fleeing the ruthless dictatorship of their home country and unaccompanied minors 
from Afghanistan fearing the Taliban (Eurostat 2019a; UNE 2019a, 2019b). Norway received 
                                                 




an average of 280 asylum applications per week in May, June and July. This increase could be 
explained by seasonal variations. In August, there was an increase of 500 new applications filed 
each week and in November, approximately 2,500 persons a week asked for protection. This 
was the peak of the crisis for Norway. The largest share came from Syria, fleeing as a result of 
the Syrian civil war, and the neighboring self-pronounced Islamic State (Gleick 2014; UDI n.d; 
Hovden, Mjelde, and Gripsrud 2018). Similar accounts were experienced by countries all across 
Europe.  
 
The influx of immigrants escalated quickly from the summer to the fall of 2015. The inflow to 
Greece over just a few days in October was higher than the total number of applications received 
during the whole of 2014 (Brekke and Staver 2018, 2168). Areas of reception and registration 
were overwhelmed all over Europe – from Italian and Greek islands in the south to Norway’s 
northern border with Russia: Storskog. Only a handful of asylum seekers came through 
Storskog in 2014. This changed dramatically as the route became known during the fall of 2015. 
This single border crossing point was not equipped to handle the 4,920 people that all of a 
sudden came here in October and November. In total, 5,500 persons crossed the Russian-
Norwegian border to seek asylum in 2015, before the Norwegian government on November 20 
gave orders not to consider the substance of applications registered at Storskog for applicants 
with residence permit in Russia. No asylum seekers were registered at this crossing point after 
November 29, 2015 (Brekke and Staver 2018, 2168; UDI n.d.-a).  
 
Never before have so many people arrived in Norway in such a short period of time. The 
immediate reaction among Norwegians to the precarious crisis of the fall of 2015 was 
compassion. One out of three Norwegians contributed with money, different equipment and 
gear and/or volunteering in 2015 and 2016 (Fladmoe et al. 2016; Hellevik 2017; Sætrang 2016). 
On the other hand, several studies show that sudden influx of asylum seekers and intense 
political and media attention, as we saw in 2015, tend to lead to increased exclusionary attitudes 
toward immigration. Bjånesøy (2019a) aims to capture ordinary citizens’ perception of asylum 
seekers by analyzing open-ended questions before and after the 2015 refugee crisis. She finds 
that perceptions changed, from seeing them as human beings in need of help, to people fleeing 
from war and difficult situations. This implies a change from a “deserving and involved”-






3.4.4.3 Policy Shifts During and After the Refugee Crisis  
The refugee crisis did not only result in shifts of the public opinion, but also of policies. This 
section will deal with the policy shifts on the international, European and national level – each 
in turn.  
 
GLOBAL RESPONSE: THE UN GLOBAL COMPACTS ON MIGRATION AND 
REFUGEES 
“Refugees are the responsibility of the world. …Proximity doesn’t define responsibility.” 
(Peter Sutherland, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
International Migration, cited in UN news (2015)).   
 
As a reaction to the large migration flows the world is facing, the UN General Assembly held 
the first summit ever dedicated to this topic on September 19, 2016. The aim of this summit 
was to bring states together behind a more humane and coordinated approach, addressing the 
dilemma of a more equitable responsibility-sharing for refugee protection among States. A State 
is obliged to assist and protect refugees according to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but the 
duties of other States to assist and “relieve the burden” has not been clear (Gammeltoft-Hansen 
et al. 2017, 4; Dowd and McAdam 2017, 864; UN 2016; UNHCR 2010). Migration is 
transboundary by nature, hence collaboration between States is necessary. The preamble of the 
1951 Convention even refers to international cooperation explicitly (Türk and Garlick 2016, 
657; 659):  
 
considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain 
countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has 
recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without 
international co-operation, (UNHCR 2010, 13). 
 
The result of the just mentioned UN summit was the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees 
and Migrants. This declaration expressed solidarity with those who flee and an obligation to 
respect their human rights. It addressed the need of support for countries highly affected by 
large movements of people and recognized the burden this is putting on states, especially 
developing countries. The importance of international cooperation for refugee protection was 
emphasized and the adoption of a Migration Compact and Refugee Compact were proclaimed 




principles but short on specific commitments” (Doyle 2019, 618). Dowd and McAdam (2017, 
865) underline the lack of “clear action points, accountability mechanisms or targets” in the 
Global Compact on Refugees, which was originally supposed to be called “Global Compact on 
Responsibility Sharing for Refugees”. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees were both adopted in 2018. They do not entail 
any new legal obligations. The Migration Compact “is intended to serve as a common 
framework for the ‘good governance’ of migration that will both guarantee minimum standards 
for migrants and facilitate international cooperation on migration challenges” (Gammeltoft-
Hansen et al. 2017, 11). It is drafted by the States. The Refugee Compact, on the other hand, 
was drafted by UNHCR. It was of course constrained by what States would agree to, and an 
important aspect is thus how it builds directly on the already existing body of international law 
(McAdam 2019, 573). It aims to “operationalize the principles of burden- and responsibility-
sharing to better protect and assist refugees and support host countries and communities” 
(UNHCR 2010, 2). The use of the term “burden” has been criticized. UNHCR and civil society 
encourage the use of “responsibility-sharing” instead. (Türk and Garlick, 664) cites Ann Vibeke 
Eggli as follows:  
 
The word ‘burden’ suggests that asylum seekers have ‘lost all human value and have 
become negotiable and transferable commodities ... leaving the individual with no will 
or say’. She also notes that refugees are ‘generally seen by their hosts as a burden and 
not a valuable asset’ (2016, 664).  
 
The term is still widely used both in policymaking and academia, often interchangeably with 
responsibility-sharing.  
 
EUROPE’S RESPONSE: A REFORM OF THE CEAS AND DUBLIN REGULATION  
The refugee crisis of 2015 revealed significant structural weaknesses of the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) and the Dublin regulation. Asylum seekers experienced varying 
treatment across country borders during the crisis, encouraging movement from one member 
state to another. Although the influx has subsided for now, Europe is expecting similar 
situations in the future. Therefore, the EU needs to be better prepared for new large migration 
flows (European Commission 2018a; Lassen and Lee 2019; Radjenovic 2019). The Dublin 
system was never designed to ensure responsibility-sharing, and since 2009 the Parliament has 




public opinion the reform is not advancing (Apap, Radjenovic, and Dobreva 2019, 7; 
Radjenovic 2019). In December 2018 the Juncker Commission announced that it had to give 
up on the reform of CEAS, leaving it to be solved by the next legislature (Gotev 2018; Rasche 
2019, 1). This section will go through the existing regulation and the EC’s latest proposal for 
reform per September 2019.  
 
Under the current regulation only a few countries, primarily those geographically located at 
Europe’s southern border, are responsible for all asylum claims submitted to the EU. The 
purpose of the Dublin regulation was to ensure that the responsibility of processing an asylum 
application would lie with one Member State. This was done with the intention of hindering 
secondary movements and “asylum-shopping”, meaning moving from one country to the next 
to apply for protection multiple times (Brekke and Brochmann 2015, 147; Chetail 2016; 
Radjenovic 2019, 598). “There is now broad consensus that no EU Member State should be left 
alone to deal with the challenges of migration” (European Commission 2018b, 1). The 
Commission laid out a proposal to reform the Dublin III-regulation in May 2016. The intention 
of this proposal is to find a solution to how to deal with situations of disproportionate pressure 
on certain member states. A central component to the proposed Dublin IV regulation is as 
follows. 
 
Ensure fair sharing of responsibility between Member States by complementing the 
current system with a corrective allocation mechanism. This mechanism would be 
activated automatically in cases where Member States would have to deal with a 
disproportionate number of asylum seekers (EC and European Union: European 
Commission 2016, 4, emphasis added).  
 
This means that the member states at the borders will still initially be responsible for the 
applications. The corrective allocation mechanism will be triggered once 150% of a member 
state’s given proportion is exceeded. This proportion is a weighted estimate based on the 
country’s total GDP and the size of the population, each weighted at 50%, relative to other EU 
Member States. The system proposed by the Commission will calculate the percentage of 
applications continuously (EC and European Union: European Commission 2016, 18; Lassen 





To provide an example of how this would unfold practically, Table 3.5 shows country-specific 
weights based on the allocation proposal made by the Commission in 2016 (50% population 
and 50% GDP), the number of asylum applications received by each country in 2018, and the 
actual numbers of received applications in 2018. All “Dublin countries” as of today are included 
in this scheme. Dublin countries include all EU Member States and the four EFTA-countries as 
they are associated with the Dublin III Regulation (Eurostat 2019b). Eleven countries exceeded 
their proportional allocation based on the 50/50-weighted estimate proposed by the 
Commission in 2018. Five countries exceeded 150% of their allocated share. It is these 66,921 
asylum applications exceeding Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Malta and Luxembourg’s 
proportional share that would be distributed among the other European countries according to 
the 2016 Commission Proposal. In the situation illustrated by Table 3.5, new applications filed 
in these five countries would be relocated to one of the countries highlighted in red. These 
countries did not reach 100% of their proportional share in 2018. This proposal has been 
criticized. As the hierarchy of criteria in the proposal for Dublin IV still implies that an applicant 
has to file their application in the state of first entry, “the administrative and bureaucratic burden 
of the pre-procedure process [still] falls squarely on the Member State of entry, making the 


















150 % of the figure 





Austria 1.95% 12,947 13,710 2,92 % 19 420  
Belgium 2.37% 15,758 22,530 3,56 % 23 636  
Bulgaria 0.88% 5,870 2,535 1,32 % 8 805  
Croatia 0.56% 3,736 800 0,84 % 5 604  
Cyprus 0.14% 964 7,765 0,22 % 1 446 6 319 
Czech 
Republic 
1.66% 11,034 1,690 2,49 % 16 550 
 
Denmark 1.39% 9,214 3,570 2,08 % 13 822  
Estonia 0.21% 1,371 95 0,31 % 2 057  
Finland 1.18% 7,840 4,500 1,77 % 11 760  
France 13.31% 88,473 120,425 19,96 % 132 710  
Germany 17.67% 117,454 184,180 26,50 % 176 181 7 999 
Greece 1.59% 10,561 66,965 2,38 % 15 841 51 124 
Hungary 1.37% 9,131 670 2,06 % 13 697  
Ireland 1.38% 9,165 3,670 2,07 % 13 747  
Italy 10.89% 72,421 59,950 16,34 % 108 632  
Latvia 0.28% 1,843 185 0,42 % 2 765  
Lithuania  0.41% 2,730 405 0,62 % 4 095  
Luxembourg 0.22% 1,440 2,335 0,33 % 2 161 174 
Malta  0.08% 551 2,130 0,12 % 826 1 304 
Netherlands  3.87% 25,730 24,025 5,81 % 38 595  
Poland  5.31% 35,278 4,110 7,96 % 52 917  
Portugal 1.62% 10,752 1,285 2,43 % 16 127  
Romania 2.52% 16,772 2,135 3,78 % 25 158  
Slovakia 0.81% 5,364 175 1,21 % 8 046  
Slovenia 0.34% 2,237 2,875 0,50 % 3 355  
Spain  8.05% 53,524 54,050 12,08 % 80 286  
Sweden 2.28% 15,168 21,560 3,42 % 22 751  
United 
Kingdom 
13.51% 89,806 37,730 20,26 % 134 709 
 
Norway 1.52% 10,128 2,660 2,29 % 15 192  
Iceland 0.09% 593 775 0,13 % 890  
Switzerland 2.49% 16,541 15,160 3,73 % 24 811  
Liechtenstein 0.06% 421 165 0,10 % 632  
Total 100% 664 815 664 815 150%  66 921 
Note: Green rows highlight the countries who took a greater share than they should according 
to the proportional allocation. Prop. = Proportional. App. = Applications.  
Source: Own elaboration on Eurostat data (Eurostat 2019a), more information can be found in 






NORWAY’S RESPONSE: FROM MORE RESETTLEMENT REFUGEES TO 
RENATIONALIZATION AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES 
Although not a member of the EU, Norway upholds EU’s external borders as a member state 
of the Schengen area. Participation in Schengen also involves relevant elements such as the 
Dublin agreement and EURODAC registration (fingerprint database). Norway is not bound by 
other Asylum Directives but can choose to collaborate on a case-by-case basis. Norwegian 
authorities follow developments in EU migration policy closely and participate when it is 
considered suitable to Norwegian interests. Among other things, Norway has relocated asylum 
seekers from Greece and Italy, resettled refugees from Turkey, and Norwegian EEA funds have 
been used to strengthen the asylum system in EU countries such as Greece (Bendixsen 2016, 
540; Brekke and Staver 2018, 2167; Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2019). During the 
spring of 2015, several Norwegian political parties proclaimed that they wanted Norway to 
house more resettlement refugees (Gjerde 2015; Sandvik 2015).  
 
Resettlement refugees (quota refugees) are usually people who are registered as 
refugees by the UNHCR, but who cannot be offered a permanent solution in the country 
they are currently in and who are therefore offered resettlement in a third country. (…) 
The Norwegian parliament, the Storting, decides how many resettlement refugees 
Norway will receive per year. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security decides which 
main groups of refugees we are to receive (UDI n.d.-b). 
 
A quota of 8,000 Syrian refugees was agreed by all political parties except the Socialist Left 
(SV) and the Progress Party (FrP) in June 2015. SV because the number was not ambitious 
enough, and FrP because they did not want Norway to accept any more refugees than what had 
already been committed to before the agreement (Falch-Olsen et al. 2015). This agreement was 
called “Flyktningforliket”, meaning “the refugee settlement”.  
 
With rapidly increasing arrivals well into the fall of 2015, the compassion and willingness to 
help refugees in need was turned into pressure to “regain control”. Between September and 
November, the focus shifted from European to national solutions. This is what Brekke and 
Staver (2018) label renationalization. On November 24 temporary border controls were 
introduced in Norway. “The reintroduction of national border controls is the most tangible and 
visible example of this dynamic”, according to Brekke and Staver (2018, 2173). The border 




the Immigration Act was also presented by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in 
November. The proposal consisted of various retrenchment policies. Among them were cuts in 
social insurance benefits for asylum seekers, stricter family reunification rules, increased use 
of provisional residence permit and quicker returns. Six out of eight4 parliamentary parties 
agreed on measures to meet the refugee crisis, referred to as Restrictions I (Endringer i 
utlendingsloven (innstramninger) 2015). That is 95% of parliamentarians. In December, 
Norway got its first “Minister of Immigration and Integration”, Sylvi Listhaug. She 
immediately started the work to present a second restrictions-package. An audit document was 
presented by the Government on December 29, 2015.  It contained a list of proposals to give 
Norway “the strictest asylum/immigration policy in Europe”, according to Listhaug. It was met 
with vast criticism. An amended version was suggested by the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security in April 2016 and Restrictions II (Endringer i utlendingsloven mv. (innstramninger II) 
2016) were introduced. Norway’s Prime Minister Erna Solberg said the following in a press 
release in April 2016:  
 
“The Government has presented a series of proposals to tighten Norway’s asylum rules, 
which we consider to be essential for ensuring a more sustainable asylum policy and for 
strengthening the border control. A strict but fair asylum policy is important if we are 
to succeed in integrating persons who are eligible for a residence permit and will be 
allowed to stay in Norway” (Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of Justice and 
Public Security 2016).  
 
Several restrictions were put in effect throughout the summer and fall of 2016, but the most 
controversial proposals were not passed in Parliament (Bjånesøy 2019a, 5; Brekke and Staver 
2018, 2174; Pedersen 2016; Regjeringen Solberg no date).  
 
3.4.4.4 The Situation Today  
Never in recorded history has the world seen more displaced people than today. Around 25.9 
million of them are refugees. Fifty-seven percent come from Syria, Afghanistan and South 
Sudan. Eighty percent of refugees live in neighboring countries; Turkey being the main host 
housing 3.7 million refugees (UNHCR 2019). As of October 1, the total arrival of migrants to 
Europe in 2019 was 92,036. Since 2017, 6,515 are dead or missing in the Mediterranean (IOM 
                                                 




2019). Commission President at the time, Jean-Claude Juncker, said in his State of the Union 
speech in 2017: ”Irregular migration will only stop if there is a real alternative to perilous 
journeys” (Apap, Radjenovic, and Dobreva 2019, 3), something he did not succeed to offer 
during his parliamentary term from 2014-2019 (Rasche 2019).  
 
The number of arrivals in Europe has fallen since 2015, as shown by Figure 3.3. Nevertheless, 
migration remains high on the agenda for the UN and the EU. The situation in and around the 
Mediterranean is still very difficult. According to the UN refugee agency, the reception centers 
on Greek islands are “dangerously overcrowded” at the turn of the month September/October 
2019 (UN News 2019). Yet, the UN Refugee Agency’s new Assistant High Commissioner for 
Protection, Gillian Triggs, expresses that we are experiencing favorable development. She does 
however acknowledge that challenges remain, highlighting that more than 1,000 people have 
died crossing the Mediterranean so far this year (2019). The first Global Refugee Forum will 
be held in December 2019, one year after the affirmation of the Global Compact on Refugees. 
It remains to be seen whether this compact truly will be “a game changer”, as Triggs calls it 
(UNHCR staff 2019).   
 
Figure 3.3 | Migrant Numbers to Europe in 2015 and 2018 
 
Source: The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has collected the statistics and the map is 
produced by MacGregor (2019). 




When it comes to the reform of the CEAS and the Dublin regulation there seem to be a complete 
lack of progress. The reform process has stagnated for years, “leaving the EU ill-prepared for 
future migration and asylum challenges”, according to Lassen and Lee (2019, 1). They call the 
Dublin IV reform for the “Guardian Knot of the CEAS”. The stagnation can be explained by 
general political divisions when it comes to the topic of migration and asylum. Growing anti-
immigrant sentiments across Europe since the reform was put on the table in 2016 has made 
the process even more challenging.  
 
How to deal with migration and in particular asylum seekers remain an ongoing discussion in 
the UN and the EU. On the contrary, Norwegian politicians seem satisfied with how the 
situation was handled. Per October 2019, Norway has received a total of 11,832 asylum 
applications since the beginning of 2016 (Eurostat 2019a; UDI 2019). That is approximately 
the number of applications Norway would receive each year before the Crisis. In 2018, 2,654 
asylum claims were registered in Norway. The arrivals seem to have stabilized at a significantly 
lower level than in the years before 2015. In fact, the numbers have not been this low since 
1995 (NTB 2019). This outcome was one of the objectives of the Norwegian right-wing 
government when the Restrictions-packages were adopted. They presumed that migrants would 
“respond to policies and legislation” and the restrictions “were supposed to make it “less 
attractive” to seek asylum in Norway and to restrict the number of asylum seekers arriving in 
the country” (Bendixsen 2016, 540).  
 
3.4.5 Additional question: Granting of Asylum 
The original article also presented data from an additional survey question that was not part of 
the survey experiment. This question concerned whether respondents would like to increase or 
reduce the number of people that were granted asylum. Data allowing for comparison of the 
public support for granting of asylum in 2016 vs. 2019 will be collected together with the survey 
experiment. Respondents are asked the question presented in Table 3.6 after the question 
concerning preferences for allocation mechanism. Table 3.6 describes the information given 
ahead, the phrasing of the question and the five-point scale response options for the question 
concerning Norway. In BHH’s survey, the question was asked twice: the first time concerning 
the European countries all together, and the second time it concerned the respondent’s home 
country. The data concerning granting of asylum in Europe all together is not presented in the 
article, but the material will still be collected in this replication in case interesting variations 




Table 3.6 | Description of Phrasing of Additional Question, Original and Replication 
 Original survey Replication survey 
Information In 2015, Norway received 31.100 
asylum applications and granted 
asylum to 7.152 people. 
In 2018, Norway received 2.660 
asylum applications and granted 
asylum to 1.755 people. 
 As a result of ongoing unrest in the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe and 
elsewhere, the number of asylum applications is expected to rise. 
Question  Do you think that Norway should increase or reduce the number of people 
who are granted asylum? 
Response 
options 
Increase to a large extent – Increase – Neither increase nor reduce – Reduce 
– Reduce to a large extent. 
Source5: The Norwegian translation of the original survey; UDI (2020); Norwegian Citizen 
Panel (2019): Study Documentation (Ivarsflaten et al. 2019), variable r16meme12. 
 
3.5 Data  
The following two sections will present the data material analyzed in the next chapter. Study 1, 
the verification, analyzes the original data collected by BHH in 2016. The data for study 2 and 
3 were collected through the Norwegian Citizen Panel wave 16 (2019). 
 
3.5.1 The Original Study’s Data  
The international survey firm Respondi recruited respondents for BHH’s sample (2017b, 2). In 
their supplementary information, BHH refer to Bergmann (2013) for details. This is a non-
probability online panel. The company mainly recruits online, and respondents are offered 
incentives: so-called Respondi-points. These can be “cashed out”, traded in coupons or donated 
(2019, 9-10). As the samples from some countries were skewed towards younger and higher 
educated respondents compared to the population of eligible voters, post-stratification weights 
are employed (2017b, 2). The specific procedure is called entropy balancing, as suggested by 
Hainmueller (2012). The sample is re-weighted to match the age, education and gender 
distributions of the populations in each country. Entropy balancing is a data preprocessing 
method developed to reduce model dependence for the estimation of treatment effects (2012, 
25). 
                                                 
5 I do not know exactly what number of granted asylum applications the Norwegian respondents were presented 
with in the original study as this is not included in the supplementary material nor in the document with the 
Norwegian translation. The latter includes numbers from 2014. According to UDI (2020), the number of people 
granted asylum (excluding resettlement refugees) was 7.152 in 2015 and 1.751 in 2018. The number I calculated 




3.5.2 The Replication Data 
As of fall 2019, around 10,000 active participants are asked to answer a survey three times a 
year. The participants are randomly selected from the Norwegian National Population Registry 
and represents a cross-section of the Norwegian population above the age of 18 (Norwegian 
Citizen Panel 2020). The data employed for this thesis were collected in November 2019. The 
data collection is done through a web-based questionnaire with postal recruitment. In order to 
maximize the response rate, an incentive in form of a gift card is included in all correspondence 
with the respondents. They may participate in the drawing of this travel gift card of 25.000 
NOK after completing the survey (Ivarsflaten et al. 2019, 5). The analysis company 
Ideas2Evidence recruits respondents, produces the survey and provides documentation of the 
data. Their methods and considerations are accounted for in the Methodology report 
(Skjervheim et al. 2019). 
 
The respondents are divided into seven subsets in NCP wave 16. Subsets are used to make room 
for more questions while ensuring that the survey does not take too long to finish for each 
respondent. It is also a way of avoiding spillover effects. The survey experiment and additional 
question presented in this thesis were asked to subset group five, which had a total of 1,133 
respondents. The respondents in this subset were then randomly assigned to one of four groups. 
Group A had 274 respondents, B had 290, C had 275 and group D had 294 respondents. There 
were 18 N/A’s across all four groups in the survey experiment, leaving me with 1,115 
respondents. For the additional question concerning the granting of asylum, there were 11 NA’s, 
resulting in 1,122 answers (Ivarsflaten et al. 2019, 156-59).  
 
There are particularly two challenges related to the representativity of the sample. The first one 
regards access and familiarity to the internet, and the second regards motivation and interest. 
This results in a systematic underrepresentation of the age group 18-29 years, and of 
respondents with little or no education. The oldest age bracket (60 years and above) is 
overrepresented: 40.8% in the net sample, whereas only 28.6% of the population. So are those 
with university and university college education in the two oldest age brackets: In this sample 
13.9% (30-39 years) and 13% (60 and above) of the men have higher education, whereas only 
9.3% (30-39 years) and 3.8% (60 and above) do in the population. For women, the numbers are 
19% (30-39 years) and 10.7% (60 and above) in the sample, and 12.2% (30-39 years) and 3.6% 
(60 and above) in the population. The sample has some skewness in regard to geography as 




(Oslo/Akershus). The most underrepresented group is respondents from the youngest age 
bracket living in the rest of Eastern Norway (Skjervheim et al. 2019, 9-12).   
 
3.5.2 To Weight or Not to Weight 
The systematic biases of the NCP sample may have implications for the generalization of my 
results, especially with regards to the level of education. The relationship between higher 
education and more negative attitudes toward immigration is well-documented (among others 
see Quillian 1995, Wagner and Zick 1995, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, Hello et al. 2002, all 
referred in Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, 319). Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014, 241) even 
suggest that higher education might be “the most powerful predictor for pro-immigration 
attitudes”. The overrepresentation of respondents with higher education in the Norwegian 
Citizen Panel may thus lead to an overestimation of the support for proportional allocation in 
the survey experiment, and more support for increasing the number of people granted asylum 
in Norway. This can be compensated for by using the variable named “weight 2” in the NCP 
data set6. This weight variable combines demographic variables (age, gender and geography) 
with education (Skjervheim et al. 2019, 13). However, the inherent problems of using weights 
in regression analysis is well-known: 
 
Most major population surveys used by social scientists are based on complex sampling 
designs where sampling units have different probabilities of being selected. Although 
sampling weights must generally be used to derive unbiased estimates of univariate 
population characteristics, the decision about their use in regression analysis is more 
complicated. Where sampling weights are solely a function of independent variables 
included in the model, unweighted OLS estimates are preferred because they are 
unbiased, consistent, and have smaller standard errors than weighted OLS estimates 
(Winship and Radbill 1994, 230).   
 
Unweighted data report accurate sample average treatment effects (SATE) but might not be 
able to report unbiased estimates of the population average treatment effects (PATE). SATE is 
a good estimate of PATE if the treatment has the same effect on all respondents, but few (if 
any) social science theories are so universal. Heterogeneous treatment effects are normally 
                                                 
6 The weight variables are provided by Ideas2evidence and made available for all as an embedded part of the data 





expected in some form. In addition to differences with regards to education level, public opinion 
on the question of asylum policy is distinct for respondents voting for political parties on the 
left and the right. The heterogeneous treatment effects will be presented in the fourth part of 
section 5.2. Note that, “if effects are known or expected to be heterogeneous by some group 
characteristic, but the sample is roughly representative on that characteristic, then weighting in 
general (and its consequent loss of power) is not worth it” (Mutz 2011, 123). The discipline of 
political science lacks a standardized procedure for reporting weighted or unweighted results 
from survey experiments. It is thus up to each researcher to decide whether to employ weights 
or not (Franco et al. 2017; Miratrix et al. 2018; Mutz 2011).  
 
In their article, BHH report estimates employing sample weights only. Unweighted results are 
reported in their Supplementary Information. The Norwegian Citizen Panel is not based on a 
design where units have different possibilities of being selected. Weights are not crucial for 
estimating PATE when analyzing NCP-data, as the sample is fairly representative (Norwegian 
Citizen Panel 2020). However, as the original data are presented with sample weights in the 
replicated article, the results reported in chapter 5 of this study are estimated employing sample 
weights as well. Miratrix et al. (2018, 289) puts it this way: “Researchers are faced with a trade-
off: more powerful estimates for the SATE, or more uncertain estimates of the PATE.” 
Furthermore, they emphasize that if estimates do not differ, SATE is probably a sufficient 
estimate for the PATE.  
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter started out by presenting the original study replicated in this thesis. It was 
conducted by BHH in the early spring of 2016. The dependent variable was the respondents’ 
answers to the question: “In your opinion, how should the number of asylum applications per 
country be determined?” and had three values: based on the country of first entry, the same for 
every European country and proportional to the country’s capacity. The independent variables 
are the four treatment groups (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a). Second, the data 
collection method utilized, population-based survey experiment, was introduced. The high 
degree of control obtained through random assignment of different manipulations is utilized to 
draw inferences regarding citizens’ trade-off between normative and consequentialist 
considerations. The third part treated the topic of replication studies. Replication studies should 




the mechanisms at play. This thesis features three forms of replication: a verification, a direct 
replication and an extended replication. This is done explicitly and systematically in order to 
leave no space between earlier research and this contribution.  
 
The design for the three forms of replication studies constituting the thesis were presented in 
part 4. The dependent variable is support for responsibility-sharing, operationalized as support 
for proportional allocation. The verification is a confirmation of BHH’s data. New, original 
data is collected for study 2 and 3. The questionnaire designed for this data collection builds 
directly on the original author’s study design but utilize the change in received asylum 
applications to Europe from 2016 to 2019. The background for the contextual change from the 
original to the replication study is described in detail under the section about the extended 
replication. The scientific gain obtained by combining a direct and an extended replication in 
the same study is quite unique. This allows for a comparison not only of the original data and 
the replication data; the effect of being presented with consequence numbers with no trade-off 
and a sharp trade-off can also be tested explicitly within the same sample and contextual 
background. Part 5 presented the data. The original study’s data were addressed first, followed 






4. Results and Analysis 
In this chapter, the results from the three replications are presented. The results will be presented 
following the same procedure as in the preceding chapters: the verification first, then the direct 
replication, and the extended replication in section three. Analyses considering sample bias and 
heterogenous treatment effects are laid out in section four, before the results for the two other 
allocation mechanisms are presented in section five. When evaluating the replication, two tests 
are reported: The size, direction and confidence interval of the effect, and whether it is 
significantly different compared to the original study. This chapter will focus on presenting the 
results and evaluate the hypotheses. What the results mean will be further discussed in the next 
chapter.  
 
All graphs and analyses are produced in R Studio. Wickham et al.’s (2019) 'dplyr' and 
Wickham’s (2016) ‘ggplot2’-packages are employed in analyzing and visualizing the data. The 
‘descr’-package (Aquino 2018) allows for the inclusion of sample weights in cross tables. The 
‘margins’-package (Leeper 2018a) offers calculations of the marginal effects from various 
regressions. Leeper’s (2018b) other package, ‘cregg’, is designed specifically for analyzing and 
visualizing conjoint factorial experiments as described by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and 
Yamamoto (2014). This package prepares for easy comparison of the average marginal 
component effects (AMCE) in the original and replication data. Recall that numeric labels are 
used for the original data, and character labels are used to describe the replication groups. 
 
4.1 Verification 
The purpose of study 1 is to control for fraud or human error, as pointed out in section 3.3 on 
replication studies. The hypotheses target the personnel involved. All variables are kept 
constant, but the analysis is done by a different investigator (Schmidt 2009, 587). The null 
hypothesis presented in section 2.4.1 states that the verification of BHH’s data collected in 
Norway show the same support for proportional allocation of asylum applications as reported 
by BHH. Support for the null hypothesis indicate a successful replication. 
 
For the verification of BHH’s data, I had to obtain their replication data, which was very easily 
done. Both their code and data are published at Harvard Dataverse. A link to the database was 
provided at the end of the article published in the journal Nature Human Behaviour. The tabular 




easy to follow as well. Both the journal and authors deserve praise for facilitating verification. 
I had no trouble verifying the original findings. As evident from Table 4.1, the separate analysis 
of the data BHH collected in Norway confirms the results reported in the supplementary 
material. When rounded to the nearest whole number, the results show the exact same numbers 
as reported by BHH. H0study1 is thus supported. The verification was successful.  
 
Table 4.1 | Verification Results  






























72% 65% 75% 74% 1191 
Source: Original data from Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2017b, 30-33) and 
replication data from Hainmueller (2017).  
R: ‘descr’ (Aquino 2018) 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the treatment effect of prompting respondents with consequence numbers 
with no trade-off in the original data. Group 1 and 3 are not included, as they are not replicated 
in the remaining parts. Group 2 is set as the baseline, so the vertical line marked ‘0.00’ in Figure 
4.1 indicates the coefficient for group 2. Recall from Table 4.1 that there is 65% support in this 
group. The point estimate indicates the treatment coefficient for group 4. The support for 
proportional allocation in this group was 74%, as illustrated in Table 4.1. The coefficient is 
positive, and the error bar does not cross the vertical line. This means that there is a significant 
positive treatment effect of prompting respondents with the numerical consequences based on 
the situation in 2015. The status quo allocation was 31,100 applications allocated to Norway, 
while the proportional allocation mechanism would have meant approximately 30,300 
applications. The alternative involving more responsibility-sharing was thus the alternative that 
would lead to the lowest number of applications allocated to Norway. This resulted in an 
increased support of 9 percentage points from group 2. The treatment effect detected in the 




Figure 4.1 | Treatment Effect Verification, Replicated Groups  
 
Source: Hainmueller (2017), variable ‘PreferProp’  
Note: Estimated using logistic regression. Prefer proportional = 1, prefer status quo/same for 
all = 0. Baseline category = Group 2: Policy information, no numerical consequences. Sample 
weights employed. Significance level: 0.05. N = 574.  
R: ‘margins’ (Leeper 2018a); ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham 2016). 
 
4.2 Direct Replication 
In study 2 all variables are kept constant. However, the sample and contextual background 
varied. As described in section 3.5, the samples are drawn from the same population, but the 
original data were collected from a non-probability online panel, whereas the sample used in 
the replication data represents a cross-section of the Norwegian population. The authors of the 
original article used entropy balancing to match the demographic margins of the population. 
When it comes to the contextual background, the literature suggests that the exogenous shock 
of the refugee crisis might have influenced public opinion on matters such as asylum policy. 
Keeping all variables constant allows to control for sampling error and chance result and, in 
this study, whether the results can be generalized to a different context. A type I error can never 
be fully discarded, but its likelihood is reduced if the results are replicated with a different 
sample obtained from the same population (Schmidt 2009, 586-87). As discussed in section 
3.3.2 on how to conduct a replication study, the reason for failure to replicate findings is less 
clear when more than one variable is changed.  
 
The results from the direct replication are reported in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2. The table shows 
that the support in group A, the condition labelled “Policy information, no numerical 
consequences”, is significantly higher compared to the support in this group captured in the 
original data. The results from group B, the condition labelled “Policy information, numerical 




The level of support for responsibility sharing in the baseline group is not within the confidence 
intervals of the original data, but that was not the criteria set for a successful direct replication 
in section 2.4. As formulated by H0study2, a successful direct replication is indicated by a 
treatment effect within a 95% normality-based confidence interval of the effect in the original 
data collected in Norway. The direct replication is considered successful if the error bar 
indicating the treatment effect of “numerical consequences no trade-off” overlaps the error bar 
in Figure 4.1.  
 
Table 4.2 | Direct Replication Results  
 Support for Proportional Allocation (%)  
Condition 
Group 2/A:  
Policy information, no 
numerical consequences 





Norway (95% CI) 64.6% (58.8, 70.3) 73.7% (68.4, 79) 285/333 
Replication data, 
Norway 70.9% 75.2% 247/250 
Source: Original data from Hainmueller (2017), variable ‘PreferProp’ and replication data from 
Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable ‘r16meme10’, a & b.  
Note: Groups from the original study are labelled with numerals and groups from the replication 
data are labelled with letters.  
R: ‘descr’ (Aquino 2018) 
 
Group A is the baseline in Figure 4.2. Accordingly, ‘0.00’ indicates the coefficient for group 
A. This group did not receive any numerical consequences. It is identical to group 2 in the 
original data. As evident from Table 4.2, there is 70.9% support for proportional allocation in 
this group. The point estimate indicates the treatment coefficient for group B. This group was 
prompted with the same consequence treatment as group 4 in the original data. These numerical 
consequences entailed no trade-off; the allocation mechanism implying responsibility-sharing 
was the alternative involving the lowest number of asylum applications to Norway. There is 
75.2% support for proportional allocation in that group in the direct replication. The coefficient 
is positive, but the error bar crosses the vertical line. The figure thus shows that the treatment 
effect of prompting respondents with the numerical consequences based on the situation in 2015 
also points in a positive direction in the replication data, but the effect is not significant. Yet, 




is within the confidence intervals of the treatment effect in the verification as illustrated by 
Figure 4.1. H0study2 is thus confirmed. The direct replication was successful.  
 
Figure 4.2 | Treatment Effect Direct Replication 
 
Source: Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable ‘r16meme10’, a & b.  
Note: Estimated using logistic regression. Prefer proportional = 1, prefer status quo/same for 
all = 0. Baseline category = Group 2/A: Policy information, no numerical consequences. 
Sample weights employed. Significance level: 0.05. N = 555.  
R: ‘margins’ (Leeper 2018a); ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham 2016). 
 
If the criteria for a successful direct replication would be the same level of support for 
proportional allocation as in the original data (within a 95% confidence interval), the direct 
replication would not have been considered successful, as the level of support has changed 
significantly in the baseline group. The treatment coefficients in Figure 4.1 and 4.2 are 
representing almost the same level of support, but as the support in the baseline group is 
significantly higher than in the original study, the treatment effect is not significant in the 
replication data. This is an indication of how contextual change has had an effect on citizens. 
There is more support for responsibility sharing in the baseline group today compared to the 
support captured by BHH in the beginning of 2016. The responses to an additional question 
about asylum policy included in the survey shed further light on the change in attitudes 
regarding asylum policy that had taken place between the BHH-data collection in 2016 and the 
replication study in 2019. 
 
4.2.1 Additional Question: Granting of Asylum   
BHH found that “not a single one [of the countries surveyed] has a majority population willing 
to accept more asylum seekers with open arms” (2017a, 1). When claiming this, they refer to 




country. These are the results from a separate question asked after the survey experiment. The 
results from the Norwegian sample were indisputable: In 2016, 44% supported a reduction in 
the number of people granted asylum in Norway when presented with the number of granted 
asylum applications for 2015. As it would be interesting to see whether Norwegians would be 
willing to “accept asylum seekers with open arms” when the situation regarding granted asylum 
applications had changed, the respondents were asked this question again in the survey 
containing the replication study, too. The results for this additional question are presented in 
Figure 4.3. The bar on top shows the results from the original data and the bar on the bottom 
shows the results from the replication data. The light areas, indicating preference for reduction 
in the number granted asylum in Norway, are dominant in the original data. The dark areas, 
indicating preference for increasing the number of granted asylum applications, are dominant 
in the replication data. 
 
Figure 4.3 | Comparison of the Support for Granting Asylum in 2016 And 2019 (Norway) 
 
Source: Original data from Hainmueller (2017), variable ‘AsylumHome’ and replication data 
from Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable ‘r16meme12’. 
Note: Respondents were presented with the number of granted asylum applications the year 
before the survey was conducted. Norway granted more than 7.000 people asylum in 2015 
(original data) and 1.750 in 2018 (replication data). 
R: Harrell (2019); Wickham (2016).  
 
After having been presented with the actual numbers of granted asylum applications for 2018, 
the results for the additional question were turned upside-down compared to the original data. 
This time, 46% would support an increase in the number of people granted asylum in Norway, 




comparison of the original data and replication data regarding this question show that close to 
a majority of Norwegians would like to reduce the number of people granted asylum when the 
number of granted applications was more than 7.000, but these preferences were reversed when 
the number of granted applications was 1.750. The results shown by Figure 4.3 indicate a 
significant change in Norwegian’s willingness to accept (relatively) more asylum seekers from 
2016 to 2019. The results for the same question, but concerning the average for all European 
countries included, are very similar. 
 
4.3 Extended Replication 
The numerical consequences of the allocation mechanisms constituting the dependent variable 
is changed for the respondents in study 3. Group 2 and 4 in the original survey and group B in 
the direct replication were presented with numbers based on the situation in 2015. The status 
quo was 31,100 applications allocated to Norway. The “same for all”-alternative would mean 
approximately 43,200 applications to each country. The proportional allocation mechanism 
would have meant approximately 30,300 applications to Norway in 2015. Group C and D in 
the extended replication were presented with numbers based on the situation in 2018. At this 
time, the status quo was 2,700 applications to Norway. The same number for all countries would 
be approximately 20,800 applications to each country. The proportional allocation would mean 
approximately 10,100 applications allocated to Norway in 2018. 
 
The purpose of study 3, as highlighted in section 3.3 on how to conduct a replication study, is 
to control for artifacts and to generalize results to a different context. The aim of the artifact 
hypothesis is to test whether the contextual background or constitution of dependent variable 
interact with the primary information focus. This is also called lack of internal validity, as the 
variable expected to explain the outcome might not actually be solely responsible for the 
changes (Schmidt 2009, 587). The hypothesis tested in this part of the study concerns how the 
support for proportional allocation changes when the numerical consequences implied by that 
alternative entail a trade-off, as opposed to the original study where the proportional allocation 
mechanism implied less applications and thus no trade-off for the Norwegian respondents.  
 
Figure 4.4 gives a summary of the treatment effects for each condition, as presented separately 
above and below. The first column shows the original data collected in Norway, the verification 
(Figure 4.1). This is the basis for evaluating whether the direct replication is successful or not. 




the original data (Figure 4.5). This forms the basis for evaluating whether the extended 
replication is successful or not. The third column shows the replication data (Figure 4.2 and 
4.6). The treatment effects for Group 4 in the verification and group B in the direct replication 
are positive, whereas the treatment effects for group 3 and 4 in the original data and group C 
and D in the extended replication are negative. The treatment “numerical consequences sharp 
trade-off” thus has the opposite effect of the “numerical consequences no trade-off”-treatment. 
These contradictory treatment effects demonstrate that the numerical consequences play a 
decisive role in forming citizens’ preferences for allocation of asylum applicants. 
 
Figure 4.4 | Average Marginal Component Effects, All Results  
 
Source: Original data from Hainmueller (2017), variable ‘PreferProp’ and replication data from 
Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable r16meme10a, b, c and d.  
Note7: Estimated using logistic regression. Prefer proportional = 1, prefer status quo/same for 
all = 0. Corresponding normality-based 95% confidence intervals are shown.  
R: ‘cregg’ (Leeper 2018b). 
 
The results from the extended replication are reported in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.6. The average 
pooled results from group 3 and 4 in the original data are reported in the first column in Table 
4.38. The remaining columns report the extended replication. The table shows that the support 
for proportional allocation among Norwegians prompted with numerical consequences with a 
sharp trade-off in the replication study, group C and D, is higher than the pooled support for 
group 3 and 4 in the original data. A larger proportion of respondents support the proportional 
                                                 
7 The labels for group C and D have “sharp” in parenthesis as this label has been used for the replication data, but 
a sharp trade-off is not the case for all countries included in the data in column 2. 
8 The support for proportional allocation in each group in the original data were reported in chapter 2. See Table 




allocation mechanism in the extended replication than in the original pooled data. However, 
this still make up a considerable reduction in the support for responsibility-sharing from the 
replication baseline. There is a reduction in the support captured in the replication data of 8 
percentage points from group A (70.9%) to the average for group C and D (62.9). The data 
show that consequentialist considerations clearly outdo preferences for responsibility sharing 
for a substantial proportion of citizens. Yet, among a majority of citizens normative 
considerations override consequentialist considerations when the two collide. 
 


































Allocation (95% CI) 
56.45 %  
(55.25, 58.15) 
66.7% 59% 62.85% 
N 8,905 252 273 525 
Source: Original data from Hainmueller (2017), variable ‘PreferProp’ and replication data from 
Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable ‘r16meme10’, c & d.  
Note: Groups from the original study are labelled with numerals and groups from the replication 
data are labelled with letters. 
R: ‘descr’ (Aquino 2018) 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the treatment effects of the numerical consequences in the original data, 
pooled across all countries surveyed. Recall that these treatment effects were all based on the 
situation in 2015 and varied from country to country. Some respondents thus had to make a 
sharp trade-off, while to others, the difference between the status quo and proportional 
allocation did not really make a big difference. As emphasized by this thesis, there were even 
some countries that would benefit from the proportional allocation mechanism. All countries 
surveyed in the original data are included in this figure, as that forms the basis for the argument 
posed in the original study. To compare the probability of wanting proportional allocation when 
prompted with numerical consequences in 2016 vs. 2019, the results presented in Figure 4.6 are 




Figure 4.5 | Treatment Effects of Numerical Consequences, Original Data, Pooled  
 
Source: Hainmueller (2017), variable ‘PreferProp’.  
Note: Estimated using logistic regression. Prefer proportional = 1, prefer status quo/same for 
all = 0. Baseline category = Group 2: Policy information, no numerical consequences. Sample 
weights employed. Significance level: 0.05. N = 13,456.  
R: ‘margins’ (Leeper 2018a); ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham 2016). 
 
Figure 4.6 | Treatment Effects of Numerical Consequences, Extended Replication 
 
Source: Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable ‘r16meme10’, a, c & d’.  
Note: Estimated using logistic regression. Prefer proportional = 1, prefer status quo/same for 
all = 0. Baseline category = Group A: Policy information, no numerical consequences. Sample 
weights employed. Significance level: 0.05. N = 774.  
R: ‘margins’ (Leeper 2018a); ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham 2016). 
 
The baseline in Figure 4.5 is group 2 pooled across all countries. There was 68.8% support for 
proportional allocation in this group, as reported in Table 2.2. The bottom coefficient shows the 
treatment effect for group 3 pooled and the upper shows the treatment effect for group 4 pooled. 
There was 57.5% support in group 3 and 55.5% support in group 4, as presented in Table 2.2. 
Both coefficients are negative, and the error bars do not overlap the vertical line. The figure 




prompting respondents with the consequence numbers. This means that overall, respondents 
prompted with numerical consequences were less likely to prefer proportional allocation in the 
original study. Figure 4.6 shows the treatment effects for group C and D in the replication data. 
The coefficient for group A is set as the baseline. As presented in Table 4.2, the support for 
proportional allocation was 70.9% in this group. The bottom coefficient indicates the treatment 
effect in group C, this error bar crosses the vertical line. The top coefficient indicates the 
treatment effect in group D, this error bar does not cross the vertical line. Both coefficients are 
negative. The figure thus shows that the treatment effect of “Policy information, numerical 
consequences sharp trade-off” is negative for both groups, but the effect is only significant for 
group D.  
 
As formulated by H0study3, a successful extended replication is indicated by a treatment effect 
within a 95% normality-based confidence interval of the treatment effects in all groups that 
were presented with numerical consequences in the original data. These criteria for assessing 
whether or not the extended replication was successful were decided based on that these were 
the data BHH drew their conclusions from. H0study3 is confirmed, as comparison of Figure 4.5 
and 4.6 show that the confidence intervals of the treatment effects overlap between -0.10 and   
-0.15. The criteria for a successful extended replication presented in section 2.4 were met.  
 
4.4 Sample Bias and Heterogenous Treatment Effects  
As accounted for in section 3.5, the Norwegian Citizen Panel has some known biases. Higher 
educated and older people are overrepresented in the sample. Level of education creates the 
strongest bias. Because the article replicated here uses sample weights for their presented 
estimates, all the analysis presented so far in this chapter are done using weighted data as well. 
Figure 4.7 lends further support for this decision. It shows results from two separate regressions 
using unweighted data, one with data containing respondents with university or university 
college education, and one with data containing respondents with no education or only upper 
secondary education. The marginal means show that there are significant differences in the 
support for proportional allocation between the respondents with higher and no higher 
education. The support for proportional allocation is significantly lower for those with no 
university education compared to those who do have university education, in all groups except 
the baseline group. This is in line with the well-established relationship between higher 




Figure 4.7 | Comparison of Support for Proportional Allocation, University and No 
University Education  
 
Source: Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable ‘r16meme10’, a, b, c & d.  
Note: Prefer proportional = 1, prefer status quo/same for all = 0. Sample weights employed. 
Corresponding normality-based 95% confidence intervals are shown. Grouped by variable 
‘r16P4_1’: “Highest completed education”. 
R: ‘margins’ (Leeper 2018a); ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham 2016). 
 
In section 3.5.2 on the use of weighted variables, the possibility of heterogeneous treatment 
effects was also mentioned as an argument for employing sample weights in the analysis of 
survey experiments. In the literature review of studies of attitudes toward immigration, political 
ideology was highlighted as a variable that may play an important role in determining 
immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 241-245). In the case of Norway, it is 
very likely that heterogeneous effects may be discovered for respondents that would vote for 
the Progress Party (FrP). These respondents would typically worry more about what the 
consequences of the asylum policy would entail for Norway, and care less about the benefits of 
an international agreement. This should become apparent as a positive treatment effect toward 
proportional allocation from group B among this group of respondents. Figure 4.7 show the 
marginal means when two separate regressions for FrP-voters and other respondents are 
conducted. In the groups that had to make the trade-off the support for proportional allocation 
is between 15% and 16% among FrP voters, as opposed to 66-68% for other voters. Support 
for proportional allocation in the baseline groups are 28% for FrP voters and 77% for other 
respondents. In group B however, where proportional allocation was the alternative leading to 
the lowest number of applicants to Norway, support for proportional allocation is 65% for FrP 
voters and 74% for other respondents. As is evident from Figure 4.8, there is a significant 
difference in the treatment effect of group B on FrP voters. Significantly more FrP voters prefer 




Figure 4.8  | Comparison of Support for Proportional Allocation, FrP Voters and Other 
 
Source: Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable r16meme10a, b, c and d.  
Note: Prefer proportional = 1, prefer status quo/same for all = 0. Corresponding normality-
based 95% confidence intervals are shown. Grouped by variable ‘r16pk204’ (Which party 
would you vote for if there were a parliamentary election tomorrow?). 
R: ‘margins’ (Leeper 2018a); ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham 2016). 
 
Figure 4.9  | Comparison of Average Marginal Component Effects, FrP Voters and Other 
 
Source: Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable r16meme10a, b, c and d.  
Note: Prefer proportional = 1, prefer status quo/same for all = 0. Corresponding normality-
based 95% confidence intervals are shown. Grouped by variable ‘r16pk204’ (Which party 
would you vote for if there were a parliamentary election tomorrow?). 
R: ‘margins’ (Leeper 2018a); ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham 2016). 
 
Recall the following: “if effects are known or expected to be heterogeneous by some group 
characteristic, but the sample is roughly representative on that characteristic, then weighting in 
general (and its consequent loss of power) is not worth it” (Mutz 2011, 123). This is not the 
case for NCP and representation of respondents affiliated with FrP. In this sample, 5.7% of the 




(Skjervheim et al. 2019, 14). The underrepresentation of FrP voters, which is reduced to 1.9 
percentage points in the weighted data, lends further support to the decision of employing 
weights.  
 
4.5 Support for Status Quo and Same for All 
As the main focus of the original article is on the support for proportional allocation, the 
dependent variable in the preceding analyses was coded dichotomously. It is in the manner of 
the original study labelled “Prefer Proportional”. All responses preferring proportional is coded 
1, and both “first entry” and “same for all” is coded as 0. Figure 4.9 reports the results for all 
three allocation mechanisms by condition. The support for each allocation mechanism in the 
original and replication data is also reported in appendix D. The support for the “same for all”-
mechanism ranges from 2.8-9.5% and is thus negligible – as expected. Support for status quo 
ranges from 15.8-37.4%.  
 
Figure 4.10 | Norwegians’ Support for Various Allocations of Asylum Seekers in 2019 
  
Source: Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable r16meme10a, b, c and d. 
Note: Percentage of respondents who prefer proportional, equal or status quo allocation given 
random assignment to one of four conditions.  
R: Harrell (2019); Wickham (2016). 
 
4.6 Summary 
The analyses of the data presented in this chapter show that all the null hypotheses are 
supported. All three studies resulted in successful replications. In the verification, BHH’s 
reported results were reproduced, and thus confirmed H0study1: The support among Norwegians 
for proportional allocation of asylum applicants match the results reported in the original 




deviates from the reported data is rejected. A majority of Norwegians supported proportional 
allocation in 2016.  
 
The direct replication showed that the baseline support for proportional allocation is 
significantly higher today compared to the respondents given the same condition in the original 
data. The treatment effect of prompting respondents with the numerical consequences from 
2015 has not changed though, and H0study2 is thus supported: The treatment effect of prompting 
respondents with consequence numbers with no trade-off is within the 95% confidence intervals 
of the support among Norwegians reported in the original study. Accordingly, H2: The 
treatment effect of prompting respondents with consequence numbers with no trade-off deviates 
from the effect in the original data is rejected. A majority of Norwegians still support 
proportional allocation in 2019 when prompted with the consequences from 2015.  
 
The results from the additional question asking respondents if they would like Norway to grant 
more people asylum are in line with the significantly higher support for responsibility sharing 
captured by the change in baseline support in the direct replication. The comparison to the 
results from the verification of the data collected in 2016 show that these preferences are now 
turned upside-down. In 2015, Norway granted asylum to 5,400 more people than in 2018. Thus, 
these results are not that surprising. These results are informative as they indicate whether there 
has been a change in the general public opinion on asylum policy. 
 
The tougher test of BHH’s finding, the extended replication, lends further support for their 
conclusion. This study tests the second part of the research question: whether the support for 
responsibility-sharing persists even when it means accepting more applicants. H0study3 is 
confirmed: The treatment effect of prompting respondents with consequence numbers with a 
sharp trade-off is within the 95% confidence intervals of the pooled results for the average of 
group 3 and 4 reported in the original study. Accordingly, H3: The treatment effect of 
prompting respondents with consequence numbers with a sharp trade-off deviates from the 
effect captured in group 3 and 4 in the original pooled data is rejected. A majority of 
Norwegians still support proportional allocation even when it means Norway must accept more 
asylum applicants. 
 
The analyses presented in section 4.4 show that the support for proportional allocation is 




across all conditions except the baseline. The figures show that there are considerable 
heterogenous treatment effects when the support among FrP voters is compared to other voters. 
These analyses lend further support for employing sample weights in the main analyses. Section 
4.5 reported the support for the two other allocation mechanisms. The average support for status 






5. Discussion of Findings  
This chapter discusses the findings laid out in the preceding chapter. The tables and figures 
presented are summarized in Table 5.1. The first section of the discussion primarily discusses 
the direct replication and what impact the contextual background have on the results. How the 
findings laid out here relate to the theoretical framework of the original study is then addressed. 
The third and fourth section mainly focus on the impact of the sharp trade-off, and thus concern 
the extended replication. Some discussion concerning the additional question follows in section 
five.  
 
Table 5.1 | Evaluation of the Hypotheses 







Group 1 Norway 
(N=295) 
71.99% 72.2% Successfully 
replicated 
Group 2 Norway 
(N=285) 
64.57% 64.6% Successfully 
replicated 
Group 3 Norway 
(N=278) 
74.97% 74.8% Successfully 
replicated 
Group 4 Norway 
(N=333) 





Group 2 Norway, 
Group A (N=247) 
64.57%  
(58.8, 70.34) 
70.9% Support is 
higher 
Group 4 Norway, 
Group B (N=250) 
73.71%  
(68.4, 79.02) 














Group 3 and 4 
pooled,  
Group C (N=252)  
& D (N=273) 

















Source: Original data from Hainmueller (2017), variable ‘PreferProp’ and replication data from 
Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable r16meme10a, b, c and d.  
Note: CIs based on N in each group. Successfully replicated means that the replication results 
comply with the levels defined in the hypotheses.  




5.1 The Refugee Crisis’ Effect on Public Opinion 
A striking finding in the direct replication is the significant change in the baseline support for 
proportional allocation. Among the respondents given policy information, but no numerical 
consequences (group 2/A), the support for proportional allocation has increased by 11.2 
percentage points from 2016 to 2019. This change is most likely explained by the contextual 
background. With regard to the adjustments made from BHH’s original study9; the instructions 
are close to identical, and the measures, stimuli, location and participant population are exactly 
the same. The procedure and remuneration are different but should not affect the results. The 
difference in the results are thus expected to be explained by the contextual background. As 
accounted for in the section about the background for the extended replication, an important 
contextual change since the original study was conducted has involved a substantial reduction 
in the number of asylum applications received by Norway. The situation regarding refugees 
appeared calmer and more under control from a Norwegian perspective when the replication 
data were collected.  
 
The results for group B show that there has basically been no change in the support for 
proportional allocation in the group given consequence numbers with no trade-off (0.6 
percentage points increase). The same changes in the parts of the study as those just mentioned 
for group A were made for group B. It thus seems as presenting the numbers with no trade-off 
had a soothing effect on the respondents in 2016, which was not effective in 2019. Considering 
the precarious situation Europe and Norway found itself in when the original data were 
collected, the Norwegian respondents that were not presented with numerical consequences 
probably thought that moving to the proportional allocation mechanism would further increase 
the number of asylum applicants to Norway. Those who were presented with the consequences 
of the policy mechanisms, were informed that moving to proportional would actually lead to a 
decrease of 785 applicants, and the consequence treatment thus had a positive effect on the 
Norwegian respondents.  
 
The findings of the direct replication underpin the existing literature on the refugee crisis’ effect 
on public opinion. Comparison of the data collected in 2016 and 2019 suggests a shift in 
baseline attitudes. However, the criteria for a successful replication in this study did not concern 
                                                 




the level of support. The hypotheses of this thesis emphasized replication of the treatment 
effects found in the original study.  
 
5.2 The Theoretical Argument of the Original Study 
As their theoretical contribution, the original authors stress that “the norm of proportional 
equality can preponderate over narrow consequentialist considerations” (Bansak, Hainmueller, 
and Hangartner 2017a, 5). They further suggest that the force of proportional equality they 
identify might be applicable to other controversial contexts such as climate change mitigation, 
environmental protection and financial bailouts. The verification performed here shows, as 
emphasized by BHH in the replicated article, that Europeans supported a proportional allocation 
of asylum seekers in 2016. The direct replication shows that this support persists under different 
contextual circumstances in 2019. The extended replication shows that their results are robust 
even when respondents are prompted with updated numerical consequences involving a sharp 
trade-off between normative and consequentialist considerations.  
 
BHH also emphasize the role they find consequentialist considerations play in shaping 
preferences for asylum seekers: support for proportional allocation increases if the country 
benefits from it and is reduced if it entails greater responsibility for their country (2017a, 4). 
The data presented in the preceding chapter highlight the importance of the numerical 
consequences. The results demonstrate that there is reduced support for proportional allocation 
when this alternative implies more asylum seekers to Norway (“Consequences sharp trade-
off”), as contrasted with what is found both in the original and replication study when that 
alternative implied less asylum seekers to Norway (“Consequences no trade-off”). 
 
Overall, the replication data suggest that citizens are strongly attracted to a distribution of 
asylum applicants proportional to each country’s capacity, despite all groups being informed 
that “country of first entry” is the status quo policy. The results thus support BHH’s (2017a, 4) 
finding that the norm of proportional equality is so entrenched that it stands the test of status 
quo bias. The support for today’s policy ranges from 19-33 percent10. There are thus more 
respondents who would support a reform than those who would not, even when they are made 
aware that it would entail a greater cost for Norway, in the form of more asylum applicants. 
Only an average of 5% across all conditions would prefer the “same for all” alternative, 
                                                 




confirming BHH’s suggestion that “few voters are attracted to the alternative fairness principle” 
(Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a, 3). 
 
This replication study does not only underpin BHH’s theoretical argument. As a broader test is 
carried out, some broader discussions concerning its contributions and implications for theory 
and policy are appropriate.  
 
5.3 The Two-Factor Theory  
“If the consequence of proportional allocation is a reduction in the number of applications to 
their country support for this mechanism increases, and if the consequences imply higher 
responsibility for their country, support for proportional allocation decreases” (Bansak, 
Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2017a). It is clear that the changes in the instructions/stimuli from 
the direct to the conceptual replication had the expected effect. There is significantly less 
support for the proportional allocation mechanism among the respondents who had to make a 
sharp trade-off, those in group C and D. This is in line with Tomz’ two-factor theory of public 
preferences: “impact of self-interest on expressed preferences increases with individual 
information” (2004, 8). It is also in line with what Rho and Tomz’ found in their study: “the 
information clarified how trade policies would affect respondents, thereby helping them 
identify and advocate self-serving policies” (2017, S103). The support decreases from the 
baseline condition with 7.4 and 10.6 percentage points respectively. However, this still 
constitutes majority support. BHH claim that their results “suggest that citizens care deeply 
about the fairness of the responsibility-sharing mechanism, rather than only the consequences 
of the asylum policy”. The data presented in this thesis suggest that this is true also for 
Norwegian citizens in 2019. Even when they are informed that moving to a proportional 
distribution would lead to an increase of asylum applicants from 2.700 to 10.100, 62.85% 
support moving to this allocation mechanism.  
 
Figure 4.5 presented a comparison of the support for proportional allocation among those who 
would vote for The Progress Party (FrP) and other voters. These analyses lend further support 
to Tomz’ (2004; Tomz and Rho 2017) two-factor theory. As FrP voters in group B responded 
in a significantly different way compared to other voters; the consequence number helped them 
identify and advocate self-serving policies. The significantly lower support for proportional 




between political ideology and immigration attitudes, as mentioned in section 2.2.1 
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 245). The treatment effects were significantly different for 
this group of respondents. This is not surprising, as FrP voters were expected to choose the 
option leading to the lowest number of applicants to Norway regardless of what the mechanism 
entailed.  
 
This heterogenous treatment effect is not merely emphasized here because of its implications 
for the use of weights in my analyses. The effects illustrated by these figures also have 
implications for political dynamics. The fact that one subgroup of voters has a distinct 
instrumental preference solely for the mechanism entailing the lowest number of asylum 
applicants, first and foremost highlights that we are not dealing with an undistinguished mass 
of attitudes. A minority with strong preferences on an issue can become politically influential 
through collective mobilization. The results here show that while the majority prefers 
responsibility-sharing even if this entails more asylum seekers to Norway, FrP voters have a 
clear preference for the policy that leads to fewer asylum seekers to Norway. 
 
5.4 An Unexpected Direction of the “UN info”-group 
The absence of an increase in support among the respondents in group D compared to group C 
is interesting, as those results are contradictory to the expected effect of the additional UN info 
treatment. I have explored these mechanisms further, as a statistically significant difference 
between group C and D would be highly interesting. In a survey experiment seeking to evaluate 
the effectiveness of claims-making strategies on behalf of undocumented immigrants, human 
rights frame expressed the weakest support for government action on behalf of undocumented 
immigrants. There are no such significant effects from the UN info treatment in these data. The 
results point in the direction of such effects though, hinting toward grounds for conducting a 
survey experiment similar to Voss, Silva and Bloemraad’s (2020) also outside the American 
context. When looking at the screen shots from the survey where the data for this thesis was 
collected, it is evident that the difference in the treatment given to group D as compared to that 
of group C is not very marked. In order to discover such negative effects of the ‘UN info’-







5.5 Additional question: Granting of Asylum 
The results from the additional question show that more Norwegians are, to put it in BHH’s 
words: “willing to accept more asylum seekers with open arms”. In 2016, almost the same 
proportion of Norwegians would like to reduce the number of people granted asylum in Norway 
as the proportion who would like to increase the number in 2019. This is a further indication 
that respondents attach importance to the actual number of arrivals in any given year, that it is 
not just a relative question – a matter of “less” or “more” granted asylum applications. The 
change in support for granting more people asylum is most likely explained by the difference 
in the actual numbers of granted applications the respondents were presented with. There is a 
considerable gap between 7.152 and 1.751, and these results indicate that many Norwegians 
have a preference for a number somewhere between these two. A deliberation in this regard, is 
that respondents might actually have an idea of real numbers on this policy issue, and not only 
relative numbers. Immigration is a salient policy issue in Norwegian politics as this is a cause 
The Progress Party (Frp) is highly dedicated to. Consequently, immigration and asylum policy 
receive significant news coverage. For instance, at the Labor Party’s (Ap) 2019 party 
conference, accepting 7.000 quota refugees were proposed by several local party organizations. 
There were numerous news stories as a response to this, and these numbers gained substantial 
attention. It is possible therefore that on this matter, actual numbers might have stuck in 
ordinary citizens’ memory, and thus that some perceive more than 7,000 refugees as too many, 
but fewer as too restrictive. 
 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the results presented in the previous chapter. As made plain by Table 
5.1, all three studies, seen both independently and as a whole, are considered successful 
replications as the treatment effects were within the confidence intervals of the original results. 
The data presented in the preceding chapter support BHH’s study, but this chapter has 
highlighted some other key findings. The difference in the support in the direct replication may 
be explained by the significant reduction in asylum arrivals to Norway between 2016 and 2019. 
The results from the extended replication are in line with Tomz’ two-factor theory. The 
heterogenous effects discovered among FrP voters highlight the importance of being aware of 
distinct subgroups. This has implications for political dynamics. The unexpectedly strong 
negative effect of the treatment received by group D may be a pure coincidence, but 




different experimental set-up. The results for the additional question show a clear shift in 
Norwegians’ willingness to grant more people asylum in Norway as the number of accepted 





6. Conclusion     
This chapter offers a summary and some reflections on the thesis, highlight its contributions 
and key findings and answers the research question. 
 
6.1 Summary  
There is a major debate in Europe concerning a reform of the CEAS. A reform of the Dublin 
regulation has been the focus of attention for this investigation. As this system oblige the 
country of first entry to handle asylum claims, a huge responsibility is put on the border 
countries in the south. This became an obvious problem during the refugee crisis of 2015/2016. 
In the aftermath, international and European actors have sought to establish better cross-
national systems for the handling, processing and protection of asylum seekers. Knowledge of 
public opinion is just one of many important factors determining policy change. But evidence 
of such data is scarce. There might seem to be a growing sense of its importance, however. A 
study published in Nature Human Behaviour in 2017 presented evidence that a majority of 
Europeans would support a system of responsibility-sharing for the reception of asylum 
applicants in the form of a system based on each country’s capacity.  
 
This thesis has taken advantage of an opportunity to extend the original study conducted by 
Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2017a) (BHH) and do a tougher test of its main claim. 
The tougher test involves a comparison of data within a country where the situation regarding 
reception of asylum applications has changed substantially. By conducting a replication study, 
I have built directly on the original author’s research in order to verify and expand their work.  
Starting with a verification, the data collected by BHH in their survey-experiment in 2016 was 
analyzed in order to verify their conclusions. A new data collection then took place, as a survey-
experiment in the Norwegian Citizen Panel. The new data was then presented in two parts. A 
direct replication of treatment groups in BHH’s study was compared to the verification of the 
data from the original study. Lastly, an extended replication was compared to the pooled results 
from the original study.  
 
The research question for the thesis was:  
Do citizens support a European system of responsibility-sharing for the reception of 





There is not much existing research on this particular topic. The expectation for the study was 
thus a successful replication of BHH’s conclusion. Informing the respondents about the 
numerical consequences for each allocation mechanism was expected to increase the support 
for responsibility-sharing when the numbers entailed no trade-off and weaken the support when 
it entailed a sharp trade-off. This would be in line with Tomz’ two-factor theory. Both the 
verification, the direct and the extended replication were successful, and thus confirmed BHH’s 
theoretical assumptions and findings.  
 
Some additional results can be summarized as follows. Respondents with lower education and 
political affiliation to the right were expected to show less support for responsibility-sharing. 
Prompting respondents with the numerical consequences entailing a sharp trade-off was 
expected to reinforce these relationships. These expectations were met. Besides replicating the 
treatment effects pointed out by BHH, I had a suspicion that the general support captured by 
the authors might have been sensitive to the context of their data collection. The change in 
context from the height of the refugee crisis when the original data was collected, to a context 
where the situation appeared more “under control” when the replication data was collected, 
resulted in significantly higher baseline support for responsibility-sharing. This discovery is 
reinforced by the results for the additional question regarding granting of asylum. As opposed 
to the preferences captured in 2016, more Norwegians would also like to increase the number 
of people who are granted asylum in Europe and in Norway today.  
 
6.2 Contributions and Key Findings 
The main finding of the thesis is that a majority of citizens still support implementation of 
responsibility-sharing in the common European asylum system, but this support is clearly 
affected by the implied consequences. The results from the direct replication entailing no trade-
off was 75.2% support for responsibility-sharing. In the extended replication entailing a sharp 
trade-off the support for responsibility-sharing was 62.9% (averaged). This is a sizeable 
difference. In public opinion surveys 12.3 percentage points is considered substantial. 
Comparison of the direct and extended replication shows not only that providing citizens with 
information regarding the consequences of a policy reform have pronounced influence on the 





The results from the data collected for this thesis suggest that citizens are responsive in a 
number of ways. Tomz’ two-factor theory is appropriate in explaining the negative effect of the 
‘numerical consequences sharp trade-off’-treatment evident from the extended replication. For 
a high ratio of citizens, consequentialist considerations override the norm of proportional 
equality. Informing citizens about the numerical consequences of the allocation mechanisms 
leads to a clear shift in public opinion. If the relevant country would “benefit” from the 
allocation mechanism in the form of being allocated less asylum applications, the support for 
this mechanism increases. If the allocation mechanism implies a “higher cost” in the form of 
being allocated more asylum applications, the support for this mechanism decreases. Further 
evidence of respondent’s responsiveness is presented in the analyses of the sub-groups. For 
particular groups of citizens, the numerical consequences play a decisive role. Right-wing 
voters and respondents without higher education choose their preferred allocation mechanism 
specifically on the grounds of which mechanism entail the lowest number. Additional 
indications of responsiveness deal with the shift in context. This implies a more general 
contribution to the field of public opinion studies. The baseline support for the mechanism 
implying responsibility-sharing is significantly higher in the replication data than what BHH 
found in 2016. The proportion of citizens supporting an increase of granted asylum applications 
likewise. This indicates that the contextual background of the data collection alters the results. 
The exogenous shock of the refugee crisis and its aftermath seem to have had a temporary 
negative effect on public opinion. These findings comply with the literature investigating this 
topic. One last remark concerning citizens’ responsiveness is a suggestion for future research. 
The lack of positive effect from the “UN info”-treatment discovered here might potentially be 
an interesting topic for further examination.  
 
This replication study indicates that the main argument forwarded by BHH is robust. Despite 
the substantial change in the contextual background from the original data were collected in the 
beginning of 2016 to the replication data were collected toward the end of 2019, all the null 
hypotheses were supported. All three forms of replication were successful. The treatment effect 
found by BHH is confirmed not only in a different context, but in a within-country test. This is 
a new contribution, as BHH’s data collection tested the effect of sharp vs. no trade-off between 
countries. Considering the central part replication plays in cumulation of science, there are 
surprisingly few publications of such studies. A challenge at the center of writing this thesis 
was to establish the criteria for what should be considered a successful replication. For the 




exact same results. I knew that I could not expect the exact same result for the new data 
collection, however. Replicating the level of support within a given confidence interval would 
not satisfy the aim of the research either. Considering the last part of the research question, the 
measures for a successful replication would have to concern the change in support for 
responsibility-sharing with and without a trade-off. The next step involved defining exact 
measures for assessing whether the treatment effect was replicated, firstly in the direct 
replication, and then in the extended replication. The direct replication was relatively easy. 
Calling it a successful replication if the treatment effects were within the 95% confidence 
intervals of the groups replicated seemed to be an adequate solution. For the extended 
replication, I could have calculated the difference in average support between the baseline and 
consequence groups in all countries that had to make a trade-off. I chose to compare the 
replication data to the overall pooled results reported in the original author’s supplementary 
material instead, because the finding that this thesis aimed to replicate was based on those 
numbers. 
 
6.3 Conclusion   
Citizens support a European system of responsibility sharing for the reception of asylum 
applicants, even if it would mean accepting more asylum applicants. Through a replication 
study, new data has been collected among Norwegians and compared to the data collected for 
the original study in 2016. Support for responsibility sharing is operationalized as support for a 
mechanism proposed by the Commission suggesting proportional allocation based on each 
country’s capacity. That is as opposed to today’s system based on the country of first entry, and 
a third alternative based on numerical equality. The key finding of this thesis is that 
consequentialist considerations matter, but normative considerations are stronger. This is 
demonstrated through majority support for proportional allocation over the status quo policy 
across all treatment groups. Prompting respondents with a trade-off between consequentialist 
and normative considerations has an impact on their support for responsibility sharing, but the 
norm of proportional equality overrides their concerns about the costs a policy change would 
entail for their country. That is what BHH found in their comparison of data from 15 European 






This study successfully replicated the original study by Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner. 
However, this does not mean that the context does not matter. This study has shown an 
important and highly relevant change in attitudes from 2016 to 2019. It has also shown that the 
support for responsibility-sharing clearly is affected by the nature of the numerical trade-off. 
Conclusions based on cross-country comparisons are rarely tested later through a within-
country comparison, as I have done here. The fact that this replication study confirms the value 
and validity of the original conclusion is exciting and encouraging news for scholars of 
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8. Appendix  






B: Distribution Key  
Formula: (Population)/(Population of country with greatest population)*50 + (GDP)/(GDP of 
country with greatest GDP)*50 = Points 
Points/Points of all countries summed = Distribution key  
Key*664 815 = numbers of applications allocated to each country in 2018 
 
Variables 2018/2019:   
Population (50%), January 2019: 
https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_pjan&lang=en  







C: Detailed Results  
Public support for various allocations of asylum seekers, verification and follow-up study  
 
First entry Same for all Proportional 
No policy information, no numerical 
consequences (Group 1) 
23.4 % 4.4 % 72.2 % 
Policy information, no numerical 
consequences (Group 2) 
26 % 9.5 % 64.6 % 
No policy information, no numerical 
consequences (Group 3) 
15.8% 9.4 % 74.8 % 
Policy information, numerical 
consequences no trade-off (Group 4) 
19.5 % 6.9 % 73.6 % 
Policy information, no numerical 
consequences replication (Group A)  
22.3 % 6.9 % 70.9 % 
Policy information, numerical 
consequences no trade-off (Group B)  
17.6 % 7.2 % 75.2 % 
Policy information, numerical 
consequences sharp trade-off (Group C)  
30.6 % 2.8 % 66.7 % 
Policy information, numerical 
consequences sharp trade-off, UN info 
(Group D)  
37.4 % 3.7 % 59 % 
Source: Original data from Hainmueller (2017), variable ‘PreferProp’ and replication data from  
Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable r16meme10a, b, c and d.  
Note: The bold horizontal line separates the original data on top and the replication data below. 






Original data  
 






D: Unweighted vs. weighted data 
Comparison of Support for Proportional Allocation, Weighted and Unweighted Data 
 
Source: Norwegian Citizen Panel (2019), Wave 16, variable r16meme10a, b, c and d.  
Note: Prefer proportional = 1, prefer status quo/same for all = 0. Corresponding normality-
based 95% confidence intervals are shown.  
R: ‘margins’ (Leeper 2018a); ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham 2016). 
 
